EIC code displayed by LXR master/​include/​psa/​crypto_values.h	Source navigation Diff markup Identifier search General search
	Version: master test Revert   Change

File indexing completed on 2025-08-27 09:43:23

 /**
  * \file psa/crypto_values.h
  *
  * \brief PSA cryptography module: macros to build and analyze integer values.
  *
  * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
  * include psa/crypto.h. Drivers must include the appropriate driver
  * header file.
  *
  * This file contains portable definitions of macros to build and analyze
  * values of integral types that encode properties of cryptographic keys,
  * designations of cryptographic algorithms, and error codes returned by
  * the library.
  *
  * Note that many of the constants defined in this file are embedded in
  * the persistent key store, as part of key metadata (including usage
  * policies). As a consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage
  * format version changes).
  *
  * This header file only defines preprocessor macros.
  */
 /*
  *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
  *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
  */
 
 #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
 #define PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H
 #include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
 
 /** \defgroup error Error codes
  * @{
  */
 
 /* PSA error codes */
 
 /* Error codes are standardized across PSA domains (framework, crypto, storage,
  * etc.). Do not change the values in this section or even the expansions
  * of each macro: it must be possible to `#include` both this header
  * and some other PSA component's headers in the same C source,
  * which will lead to duplicate definitions of the `PSA_SUCCESS` and
  * `PSA_ERROR_xxx` macros, which is ok if and only if the macros expand
  * to the same sequence of tokens.
  *
  * If you must add a new
  * value, check with the Arm PSA framework group to pick one that other
  * domains aren't already using. */
 
 /* Tell uncrustify not to touch the constant definitions, otherwise
  * it might change the spacing to something that is not PSA-compliant
  * (e.g. adding a space after casts).
  *
  * *INDENT-OFF*
  */
 
 /** The action was completed successfully. */
 #define PSA_SUCCESS ((psa_status_t)0)
 
 /** An error occurred that does not correspond to any defined
  * failure cause.
  *
  * Implementations may use this error code if none of the other standard
  * error codes are applicable. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_GENERIC_ERROR         ((psa_status_t)-132)
 
 /** The requested operation or a parameter is not supported
  * by this implementation.
  *
  * Implementations should return this error code when an enumeration
  * parameter such as a key type, algorithm, etc. is not recognized.
  * If a combination of parameters is recognized and identified as
  * not valid, return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT instead. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED         ((psa_status_t)-134)
 
 /** The requested action is denied by a policy.
  *
  * Implementations should return this error code when the parameters
  * are recognized as valid and supported, and a policy explicitly
  * denies the requested operation.
  *
  * If a subset of the parameters of a function call identify a
  * forbidden operation, and another subset of the parameters are
  * not valid or not supported, it is unspecified whether the function
  * returns #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED, #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED or
  * #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED         ((psa_status_t)-133)
 
 /** An output buffer is too small.
  *
  * Applications can call the \c PSA_xxx_SIZE macro listed in the function
  * description to determine a sufficient buffer size.
  *
  * Implementations should preferably return this error code only
  * in cases when performing the operation with a larger output
  * buffer would succeed. However implementations may return this
  * error if a function has invalid or unsupported parameters in addition
  * to the parameters that determine the necessary output buffer size. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL      ((psa_status_t)-138)
 
 /** Asking for an item that already exists
  *
  * Implementations should return this error, when attempting
  * to write an item (like a key) that already exists. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS        ((psa_status_t)-139)
 
 /** Asking for an item that doesn't exist
  *
  * Implementations should return this error, if a requested item (like
  * a key) does not exist. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST        ((psa_status_t)-140)
 
 /** The requested action cannot be performed in the current state.
  *
  * Multipart operations return this error when one of the
  * functions is called out of sequence. Refer to the function
  * descriptions for permitted sequencing of functions.
  *
  * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate
  * that a key either exists or not,
  * but shall instead return #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS or #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
  * as applicable.
  *
  * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a
  * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
  * instead. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE             ((psa_status_t)-137)
 
 /** The parameters passed to the function are invalid.
  *
  * Implementations may return this error any time a parameter or
  * combination of parameters are recognized as invalid.
  *
  * Implementations shall not return this error code to indicate that a
  * key identifier is invalid, but shall return #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
  * instead.
  */
 #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT      ((psa_status_t)-135)
 
 /** There is not enough runtime memory.
  *
  * If the action is carried out across multiple security realms, this
  * error can refer to available memory in any of the security realms. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY   ((psa_status_t)-141)
 
 /** There is not enough persistent storage.
  *
  * Functions that modify the key storage return this error code if
  * there is insufficient storage space on the host media. In addition,
  * many functions that do not otherwise access storage may return this
  * error code if the implementation requires a mandatory log entry for
  * the requested action and the log storage space is full. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE  ((psa_status_t)-142)
 
 /** There was a communication failure inside the implementation.
  *
  * This can indicate a communication failure between the application
  * and an external cryptoprocessor or between the cryptoprocessor and
  * an external volatile or persistent memory. A communication failure
  * may be transient or permanent depending on the cause.
  *
  * \warning If a function returns this error, it is undetermined
  * whether the requested action has completed or not. Implementations
  * should return #PSA_SUCCESS on successful completion whenever
  * possible, however functions may return #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE
  * if the requested action was completed successfully in an external
  * cryptoprocessor but there was a breakdown of communication before
  * the cryptoprocessor could report the status to the application.
  */
 #define PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE ((psa_status_t)-145)
 
 /** There was a storage failure that may have led to data loss.
  *
  * This error indicates that some persistent storage is corrupted.
  * It should not be used for a corruption of volatile memory
  * (use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED), for a communication error
  * between the cryptoprocessor and its external storage (use
  * #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE), or when the storage is
  * in a valid state but is full (use #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE).
  *
  * Note that a storage failure does not indicate that any data that was
  * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data may no
  * longer be readable from storage.
  *
  * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure
  * the global integrity of the keystore. Depending on the global
  * integrity guarantees offered by the implementation, access to other
  * data may or may not fail even if the data is still readable but
  * its integrity cannot be guaranteed.
  *
  * Implementations should only use this error code to report a
  * permanent storage corruption. However application writers should
  * keep in mind that transient errors while reading the storage may be
  * reported using this error code. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE       ((psa_status_t)-146)
 
 /** A hardware failure was detected.
  *
  * A hardware failure may be transient or permanent depending on the
  * cause. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE      ((psa_status_t)-147)
 
 /** A tampering attempt was detected.
  *
  * If an application receives this error code, there is no guarantee
  * that previously accessed or computed data was correct and remains
  * confidential. Applications should not perform any security function
  * and should enter a safe failure state.
  *
  * Implementations may return this error code if they detect an invalid
  * state that cannot happen during normal operation and that indicates
  * that the implementation's security guarantees no longer hold. Depending
  * on the implementation architecture and on its security and safety goals,
  * the implementation may forcibly terminate the application.
  *
  * This error code is intended as a last resort when a security breach
  * is detected and it is unsure whether the keystore data is still
  * protected. Implementations shall only return this error code
  * to report an alarm from a tampering detector, to indicate that
  * the confidentiality of stored data can no longer be guaranteed,
  * or to indicate that the integrity of previously returned data is now
  * considered compromised. Implementations shall not use this error code
  * to indicate a hardware failure that merely makes it impossible to
  * perform the requested operation (use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE,
  * #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE, #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE,
  * #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY or other applicable error code
  * instead).
  *
  * This error indicates an attack against the application. Implementations
  * shall not return this error code as a consequence of the behavior of
  * the application itself. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED    ((psa_status_t)-151)
 
 /** There is not enough entropy to generate random data needed
  * for the requested action.
  *
  * This error indicates a failure of a hardware random generator.
  * Application writers should note that this error can be returned not
  * only by functions whose purpose is to generate random data, such
  * as key, IV or nonce generation, but also by functions that execute
  * an algorithm with a randomized result, as well as functions that
  * use randomization of intermediate computations as a countermeasure
  * to certain attacks.
  *
  * Implementations should avoid returning this error after psa_crypto_init()
  * has succeeded. Implementations should generate sufficient
  * entropy during initialization and subsequently use a cryptographically
  * secure pseudorandom generator (PRNG). However implementations may return
  * this error at any time if a policy requires the PRNG to be reseeded
  * during normal operation. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY  ((psa_status_t)-148)
 
 /** The signature, MAC or hash is incorrect.
  *
  * Verification functions return this error if the verification
  * calculations completed successfully, and the value to be verified
  * was determined to be incorrect.
  *
  * If the value to verify has an invalid size, implementations may return
  * either #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT or #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE     ((psa_status_t)-149)
 
 /** The decrypted padding is incorrect.
  *
  * \warning In some protocols, when decrypting data, it is essential that
  * the behavior of the application does not depend on whether the padding
  * is correct, down to precise timing. Applications should prefer
  * protocols that use authenticated encryption rather than plain
  * encryption. If the application must perform a decryption of
  * unauthenticated data, the application writer should take care not
  * to reveal whether the padding is invalid.
  *
  * Implementations should strive to make valid and invalid padding
  * as close as possible to indistinguishable to an external observer.
  * In particular, the timing of a decryption operation should not
  * depend on the validity of the padding. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_PADDING       ((psa_status_t)-150)
 
 /** Return this error when there's insufficient data when attempting
  * to read from a resource. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_DATA     ((psa_status_t)-143)
 
 /** This can be returned if a function can no longer operate correctly.
  * For example, if an essential initialization operation failed or
  * a mutex operation failed. */
 #define PSA_ERROR_SERVICE_FAILURE       ((psa_status_t)-144)
 
 /** The key identifier is not valid. See also :ref:\`key-handles\`.
  */
 #define PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE        ((psa_status_t)-136)
 
 /** Stored data has been corrupted.
  *
  * This error indicates that some persistent storage has suffered corruption.
  * It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific error
  * codes:
  *
  * - A corruption of volatile memory - use #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED.
  * - A communication error between the cryptoprocessor and its external
  *   storage - use #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE.
  * - When the storage is in a valid state but is full - use
  *   #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE.
  * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use
  *   #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE.
  * - When the stored data is not valid - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID.
  *
  * \note A storage corruption does not indicate that any data that was
  * previously read is invalid. However this previously read data might no
  * longer be readable from storage.
  *
  * When a storage failure occurs, it is no longer possible to ensure the
  * global integrity of the keystore.
  */
 #define PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT          ((psa_status_t)-152)
 
 /** Data read from storage is not valid for the implementation.
  *
  * This error indicates that some data read from storage does not have a valid
  * format. It does not indicate the following situations, which have specific
  * error codes:
  *
  * - When the storage or stored data is corrupted - use #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT
  * - When the storage fails for other reasons - use #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
  * - An invalid argument to the API - use #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *
  * This error is typically a result of either storage corruption on a
  * cleartext storage backend, or an attempt to read data that was
  * written by an incompatible version of the library.
  */
 #define PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID          ((psa_status_t)-153)
 
 /** The function that returns this status is defined as interruptible and
  *  still has work to do, thus the user should call the function again with the
  *  same operation context until it either returns #PSA_SUCCESS or any other
  *  error. This is not an error per se, more a notification of status.
  */
 #define PSA_OPERATION_INCOMPLETE           ((psa_status_t)-248)
 
 /* *INDENT-ON* */
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \defgroup crypto_types Key and algorithm types
  * @{
  */
 
 /* Note that key type values, including ECC family and DH group values, are
  * embedded in the persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a
  * consequence, they must not be changed (unless the storage format version
  * changes).
  */
 
 /** An invalid key type value.
  *
  * Zero is not the encoding of any key type.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_NONE                           ((psa_key_type_t) 0x0000)
 
 /** Vendor-defined key type flag.
  *
  * Key types defined by this standard will never have the
  * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set. Vendors who define additional key types
  * must use an encoding with the #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should
  * respect the bitwise structure used by standard encodings whenever practical.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG                    ((psa_key_type_t) 0x8000)
 
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK                  ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000)
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW                   ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1000)
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC             ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2000)
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY            ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4000)
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR              ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7000)
 
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR             ((psa_key_type_t) 0x3000)
 
 /** Whether a key type is vendor-defined.
  *
  * See also #PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(type) \
     (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
 
 /** Whether a key type is an unstructured array of bytes.
  *
  * This encompasses both symmetric keys and non-key data.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_UNSTRUCTURED(type) \
     (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_RAW || \
      ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC)
 
 /** Whether a key type is asymmetric: either a key pair or a public key. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ASYMMETRIC(type)                                \
     (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK                               \
       & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR) ==                            \
      PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
 /** Whether a key type is the public part of a key pair. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_PUBLIC_KEY(type)                                \
     (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_PUBLIC_KEY)
 /** Whether a key type is a key pair containing a private part and a public
  * part. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_KEY_PAIR(type)                                   \
     (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_KEY_PAIR)
 /** The key pair type corresponding to a public key type.
  *
  * You may also pass a key pair type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
  *
  * \param type      A public key type or key pair type.
  *
  * \return          The corresponding key pair type.
  *                  If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
  *                  the return value is undefined.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_KEY_PAIR_OF_PUBLIC_KEY(type)        \
     ((type) | PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
 /** The public key type corresponding to a key pair type.
  *
  * You may also pass a public key type as \p type, it will be left unchanged.
  *
  * \param type      A public key type or key pair type.
  *
  * \return          The corresponding public key type.
  *                  If \p type is not a public key or a key pair,
  *                  the return value is undefined.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type)        \
     ((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_FLAG_PAIR)
 
 /** Raw data.
  *
  * A "key" of this type cannot be used for any cryptographic operation.
  * Applications may use this type to store arbitrary data in the keystore. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA                       ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1001)
 
 /** HMAC key.
  *
  * The key policy determines which underlying hash algorithm the key can be
  * used for.
  *
  * HMAC keys should generally have the same size as the underlying hash.
  * This size can be calculated with #PSA_HASH_LENGTH(\c alg) where
  * \c alg is the HMAC algorithm or the underlying hash algorithm. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_HMAC                           ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1100)
 
 /** A secret for key derivation.
  *
  * This key type is for high-entropy secrets only. For low-entropy secrets,
  * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD should be used instead.
  *
  * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET or
  * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of key derivation algorithms.
  *
  * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
  * can be used for.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE                         ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1200)
 
 /** A low-entropy secret for password hashing or key derivation.
  *
  * This key type is suitable for passwords and passphrases which are typically
  * intended to be memorizable by humans, and have a low entropy relative to
  * their size. It can be used for randomly generated or derived keys with
  * maximum or near-maximum entropy, but #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE is more suitable
  * for such keys. It is not suitable for passwords with extremely low entropy,
  * such as numerical PINs.
  *
  * These keys can be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input of
  * key derivation algorithms. Algorithms that accept such an input were
  * designed to accept low-entropy secret and are known as password hashing or
  * key stretching algorithms.
  *
  * These keys cannot be used as the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET input of
  * key derivation algorithms, as the algorithms that take such an input expect
  * it to be high-entropy.
  *
  * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key can be
  * used for, among the permissible subset defined above.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD                       ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1203)
 
 /** A secret value that can be used to verify a password hash.
  *
  * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
  * can be used for, among the same permissible subset as for
  * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH                  ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1205)
 
 /** A secret value that can be used in when computing a password hash.
  *
  * The key policy determines which key derivation algorithm the key
  * can be used for, among the subset of algorithms that can use pepper.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER                         ((psa_key_type_t) 0x1206)
 
 /** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the AES block cipher.
  *
  * The size of the key can be 16 bytes (AES-128), 24 bytes (AES-192) or
  * 32 bytes (AES-256).
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES                            ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2400)
 
 /** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
  * ARIA block cipher. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ARIA                           ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2406)
 
 /** Key for a cipher or MAC algorithm based on DES or 3DES (Triple-DES).
  *
  * The size of the key can be 64 bits (single DES), 128 bits (2-key 3DES) or
  * 192 bits (3-key 3DES).
  *
  * Note that single DES and 2-key 3DES are weak and strongly
  * deprecated and should only be used to decrypt legacy data. 3-key 3DES
  * is weak and deprecated and should only be used in legacy protocols.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DES                            ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2301)
 
 /** Key for a cipher, AEAD or MAC algorithm based on the
  * Camellia block cipher. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CAMELLIA                       ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2403)
 
 /** Key for the ChaCha20 stream cipher or the Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
  *
  * ChaCha20 and the ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction are defined in RFC 7539.
  *
  * \note For ChaCha20 and ChaCha20_Poly1305, Mbed TLS only supports
  *       12-byte nonces.
  *
  * \note For ChaCha20, the initial counter value is 0. To encrypt or decrypt
  *       with the initial counter value 1, you can process and discard a
  *       64-byte block before the real data.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20                       ((psa_key_type_t) 0x2004)
 
 /** RSA public key.
  *
  * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY                 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4001)
 /** RSA key pair (private and public key).
  *
  * The size of an RSA key is the bit size of the modulus.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_KEY_PAIR                   ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7001)
 /** Whether a key type is an RSA key (pair or public-only). */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_RSA(type)                                       \
     (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_RSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
 
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE            ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4100)
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE              ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7100)
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK                 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
 /** Elliptic curve key pair.
  *
  * The size of an elliptic curve key is the bit size associated with the curve,
  * i.e. the bit size of *q* for a curve over a field *F<sub>q</sub>*.
  * See the documentation of `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families for details.
  *
  * \param curve     A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that
  *                  identifies the ECC curve to be used.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR(curve)         \
     (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (curve))
 /** Elliptic curve public key.
  *
  * The size of an elliptic curve public key is the same as the corresponding
  * private key (see #PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR and the documentation of
  * `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_xxx` curve families).
  *
  * \param curve     A value of type ::psa_ecc_family_t that
  *                  identifies the ECC curve to be used.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(curve)              \
     (PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (curve))
 
 /** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key (pair or public-only). */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type)                                       \
     ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) &                        \
       ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
 /** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve key pair. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_KEY_PAIR(type)                               \
     (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) ==                         \
      PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
 /** Whether a key type is an elliptic curve public key. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY(type)                            \
     (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) ==                         \
      PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
 
 /** Extract the curve from an elliptic curve key type. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_GET_FAMILY(type)                        \
     ((psa_ecc_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_ECC(type) ?             \
                          ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_ECC_CURVE_MASK) : \
                          0))
 
 /** Check if the curve of given family is Weierstrass elliptic curve. */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_IS_WEIERSTRASS(family) ((family & 0xc0) == 0)
 
 /** SEC Koblitz curves over prime fields.
  *
  * This family comprises the following curves:
  * secp192k1, secp224k1, secp256k1.
  * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
  * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
  * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
  *
  * \note For secp224k1, the bit-size is 225 (size of a private value).
  *
  * \note Mbed TLS only supports secp192k1 and secp256k1.
  */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_K1           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x17)
 
 /** SEC random curves over prime fields.
  *
  * This family comprises the following curves:
  * secp192r1, secp224r1, secp256r1, secp384r1, secp521r1.
  * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
  * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
  * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
  */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x12)
 /* SECP160R2 (SEC2 v1, obsolete, not supported in Mbed TLS) */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R2           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x1b)
 
 /** SEC Koblitz curves over binary fields.
  *
  * This family comprises the following curves:
  * sect163k1, sect233k1, sect239k1, sect283k1, sect409k1, sect571k1.
  * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
  * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
  * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
  *
  * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
  */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_K1           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x27)
 
 /** SEC random curves over binary fields.
  *
  * This family comprises the following curves:
  * sect163r1, sect233r1, sect283r1, sect409r1, sect571r1.
  * They are defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
  * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
  * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
  *
  * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
  */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R1           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x22)
 
 /** SEC additional random curves over binary fields.
  *
  * This family comprises the following curve:
  * sect163r2.
  * It is defined in _Standards for Efficient Cryptography_,
  * _SEC 2: Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters_.
  * https://www.secg.org/sec2-v2.pdf
  *
  * \note Mbed TLS does not support any curve in this family.
  */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECT_R2           ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x2b)
 
 /** Brainpool P random curves.
  *
  * This family comprises the following curves:
  * brainpoolP160r1, brainpoolP192r1, brainpoolP224r1, brainpoolP256r1,
  * brainpoolP320r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1.
  * It is defined in RFC 5639.
  *
  * \note Mbed TLS only supports the 256-bit, 384-bit and 512-bit curves
  *       in this family.
  */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_P_R1    ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x30)
 
 /** Curve25519 and Curve448.
  *
  * This family comprises the following Montgomery curves:
  * - 255-bit: Bernstein et al.,
  *   _Curve25519: new Diffie-Hellman speed records_, LNCS 3958, 2006.
  *   The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X25519 when used with this curve.
  * - 448-bit: Hamburg,
  *   _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
  *   The algorithm #PSA_ALG_ECDH performs X448 when used with this curve.
  */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_MONTGOMERY        ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x41)
 
 /** The twisted Edwards curves Ed25519 and Ed448.
  *
  * These curves are suitable for EdDSA (#PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA for both curves,
  * #PSA_ALG_ED25519PH for the 255-bit curve,
  * #PSA_ALG_ED448PH for the 448-bit curve).
  *
  * This family comprises the following twisted Edwards curves:
  * - 255-bit: Edwards25519, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
  *   to Curve25519.
  *   Bernstein et al., _Twisted Edwards curves_, Africacrypt 2008.
  * - 448-bit: Edwards448, the twisted Edwards curve birationally equivalent
  *   to Curve448.
  *   Hamburg, _Ed448-Goldilocks, a new elliptic curve_, NIST ECC Workshop, 2015.
  *
  * \note Mbed TLS does not support Edwards curves yet.
  */
 #define PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS   ((psa_ecc_family_t) 0x42)
 
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE             ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4200)
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE               ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7200)
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK                  ((psa_key_type_t) 0x00ff)
 /** Diffie-Hellman key pair.
  *
  * \param group     A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
  *                  Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR(group)          \
     (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE | (group))
 /** Diffie-Hellman public key.
  *
  * \param group     A value of type ::psa_dh_family_t that identifies the
  *                  Diffie-Hellman group to be used.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(group)               \
     (PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE | (group))
 
 /** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key (pair or public-only). */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type)                                        \
     ((PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) &                        \
       ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
 /** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman key pair. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_KEY_PAIR(type)                               \
     (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) ==                         \
      PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_KEY_PAIR_BASE)
 /** Whether a key type is a Diffie-Hellman public key. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH_PUBLIC_KEY(type)                            \
     (((type) & ~PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) ==                         \
      PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_PUBLIC_KEY_BASE)
 
 /** Extract the group from a Diffie-Hellman key type. */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GET_FAMILY(type)                        \
     ((psa_dh_family_t) (PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DH(type) ?              \
                         ((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_DH_GROUP_MASK) :  \
                         0))
 
 /** Diffie-Hellman groups defined in RFC 7919 Appendix A.
  *
  * This family includes groups with the following key sizes (in bits):
  * 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192. A given implementation may support
  * all of these sizes or only a subset.
  */
 #define PSA_DH_FAMILY_RFC7919            ((psa_dh_family_t) 0x03)
 
 #define PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type)      \
     (((type) >> 8) & 7)
 /** The block size of a block cipher.
  *
  * \param type  A cipher key type (value of type #psa_key_type_t).
  *
  * \return      The block size for a block cipher, or 1 for a stream cipher.
  *              The return value is undefined if \p type is not a supported
  *              cipher key type.
  *
  * \note It is possible to build stream cipher algorithms on top of a block
  *       cipher, for example CTR mode (#PSA_ALG_CTR).
  *       This macro only takes the key type into account, so it cannot be
  *       used to determine the size of the data that #psa_cipher_update()
  *       might buffer for future processing in general.
  *
  * \note This macro returns a compile-time constant if its argument is one.
  *
  * \warning This macro may evaluate its argument multiple times.
  */
 #define PSA_BLOCK_CIPHER_BLOCK_LENGTH(type)                                     \
     (((type) & PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_CATEGORY_SYMMETRIC ? \
      1u << PSA_GET_KEY_TYPE_BLOCK_SIZE_EXPONENT(type) :                         \
         0u)
 
 /* Note that algorithm values are embedded in the persistent key store,
  * as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they must not be changed
  * (unless the storage format version changes).
  */
 
 /** Vendor-defined algorithm flag.
  *
  * Algorithms defined by this standard will never have the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG
  * bit set. Vendors who define additional algorithms must use an encoding with
  * the #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG bit set and should respect the bitwise structure
  * used by standard encodings whenever practical.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG                     ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x80000000)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x7f000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC                    ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER                 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09000000)
 
 /** Whether an algorithm is vendor-defined.
  *
  * See also #PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_DEFINED(alg)                                  \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_VENDOR_FLAG) != 0)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(alg)                                            \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg)                                             \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MAC)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a symmetric cipher algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a symmetric cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_CIPHER(alg)                                          \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an authenticated encryption
  * with associated data (AEAD) algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg)                                            \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric signature algorithm,
  * also known as public-key signature algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric signature algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(alg)                                            \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_SIGN)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an asymmetric encryption algorithm,
  * also known as public-key encryption algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is an asymmetric encryption algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION(alg)                           \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_ASYMMETRIC_ENCRYPTION)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a key agreement algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)                                   \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a key derivation algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a key derivation algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg)                                  \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a key stretching / password hashing
  * algorithm.
  *
  * A key stretching / password hashing algorithm is a key derivation algorithm
  * that is suitable for use with a low-entropy secret such as a password.
  * Equivalently, it's a key derivation algorithm that uses a
  * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD input step.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a key stretching / password hashing algorithm, 0
  *         otherwise. This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
  *         supported algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING(alg)                                  \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) &&              \
      (alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG)
 
 /** An invalid algorithm identifier value. */
 /* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */
 #define PSA_ALG_NONE                            ((psa_algorithm_t)0)
 /* *INDENT-ON* */
 
 #define PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x000000ff)
 /** MD5 */
 #define PSA_ALG_MD5                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000003)
 /** PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160 */
 #define PSA_ALG_RIPEMD160                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000004)
 /** SHA1 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA_1                           ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000005)
 /** SHA2-224 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA_224                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000008)
 /** SHA2-256 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA_256                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000009)
 /** SHA2-384 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA_384                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000a)
 /** SHA2-512 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA_512                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000b)
 /** SHA2-512/224 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_224                     ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000c)
 /** SHA2-512/256 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA_512_256                     ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0200000d)
 /** SHA3-224 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_224                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000010)
 /** SHA3-256 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_256                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000011)
 /** SHA3-384 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_384                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000012)
 /** SHA3-512 */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHA3_512                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000013)
 /** The first 512 bits (64 bytes) of the SHAKE256 output.
  *
  * This is the prehashing for Ed448ph (see #PSA_ALG_ED448PH). For other
  * scenarios where a hash function based on SHA3/SHAKE is desired, SHA3-512
  * has the same output size and a (theoretically) higher security strength.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512                    ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x02000015)
 
 /** In a hash-and-sign algorithm policy, allow any hash algorithm.
  *
  * This value may be used to form the algorithm usage field of a policy
  * for a signature algorithm that is parametrized by a hash. The key
  * may then be used to perform operations using the same signature
  * algorithm parametrized with any supported hash.
  *
  * That is, suppose that `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` is one of the following macros:
  * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS, #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT,
  * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA, #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA.
  * Then you may create and use a key as follows:
  * - Set the key usage field using #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH, for example:
  *   ```
  *   psa_set_key_usage_flags(&attributes, PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH); // or VERIFY
  *   psa_set_key_algorithm(&attributes, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH));
  *   ```
  * - Import or generate key material.
  * - Call psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash(), passing
  *   an algorithm built from `PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE` and a specific hash. Each
  *   call to sign or verify a message may use a different hash.
  *   ```
  *   psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_256), ...);
  *   psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA_512), ...);
  *   psa_sign_hash(key, PSA_xxx_SIGNATURE(PSA_ALG_SHA3_256), ...);
  *   ```
  *
  * This value may not be used to build other algorithms that are
  * parametrized over a hash. For any valid use of this macro to build
  * an algorithm \c alg, #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(\c alg) is true.
  *
  * This value may not be used to build an algorithm specification to
  * perform an operation. It is only valid to build policies.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x020000ff)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00c00000)
 #define PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03800000)
 /** Macro to build an HMAC algorithm.
  *
  * For example, #PSA_ALG_HMAC(#PSA_ALG_SHA_256) is HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *
  * \return              The corresponding HMAC algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_HMAC(hash_alg)                                  \
     (PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 #define PSA_ALG_HMAC_GET_HASH(hmac_alg)                             \
     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hmac_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HMAC algorithm.
  *
  * HMAC is a family of MAC algorithms that are based on a hash function.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is an HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_HMAC(alg)                                            \
     (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
      PSA_ALG_HMAC_BASE)
 
 /* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bits corresponding to
  * PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK encode the length to which the MAC is
  * truncated. As an exception, the value 0 means the untruncated algorithm,
  * whatever its length is. The length is encoded in 6 bits, so it can
  * reach up to 63; the largest MAC is 64 bytes so its trivial truncation
  * to full length is correctly encoded as 0 and any non-trivial truncation
  * is correctly encoded as a value between 1 and 63. */
 #define PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000)
 #define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET 16
 
 /* In the encoding of a MAC algorithm, the bit corresponding to
  * #PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm
  * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted
  * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the
  * same base class and having a (potentially truncated) MAC length greater or
  * equal than the one encoded in #PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK. */
 #define PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000)
 
 /** Macro to build a truncated MAC algorithm.
  *
  * A truncated MAC algorithm is identical to the corresponding MAC
  * algorithm except that the MAC value for the truncated algorithm
  * consists of only the first \p mac_length bytes of the MAC value
  * for the untruncated algorithm.
  *
  * \note    This macro may allow constructing algorithm identifiers that
  *          are not valid, either because the specified length is larger
  *          than the untruncated MAC or because the specified length is
  *          smaller than permitted by the implementation.
  *
  * \note    It is implementation-defined whether a truncated MAC that
  *          is truncated to the same length as the MAC of the untruncated
  *          algorithm is considered identical to the untruncated algorithm
  *          for policy comparison purposes.
  *
  * \param mac_alg       A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
  *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
  *                      is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
  *                      MAC algorithm.
  * \param mac_length    Desired length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
  *                      This must be at most the full length of the MAC
  *                      and must be at least an implementation-specified
  *                      minimum. The implementation-specified minimum
  *                      shall not be zero.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding MAC algorithm with the specified
  *                      length.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
  *                      MAC algorithm or if \p mac_length is too small or
  *                      too large for the specified MAC algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, mac_length)              \
     (((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK |               \
                     PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) |   \
      ((mac_length) << PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK))
 
 /** Macro to build the base MAC algorithm corresponding to a truncated
  * MAC algorithm.
  *
  * \param mac_alg       A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
  *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
  *                      is true). This may be a truncated or untruncated
  *                      MAC algorithm.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding base MAC algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
  *                      MAC algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_FULL_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg)                        \
     ((mac_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK |                \
                    PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG))
 
 /** Length to which a MAC algorithm is truncated.
  *
  * \param mac_alg       A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
  *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
  *                      is true).
  *
  * \return              Length of the truncated MAC in bytes.
  * \return              0 if \p mac_alg is a non-truncated MAC algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported
  *                      MAC algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_MAC_TRUNCATED_LENGTH(mac_alg)                               \
     (((mac_alg) & PSA_ALG_MAC_TRUNCATION_MASK) >> PSA_MAC_TRUNCATION_OFFSET)
 
 /** Macro to build a MAC minimum-MAC-length wildcard algorithm.
  *
  * A minimum-MAC-length MAC wildcard algorithm permits all MAC algorithms
  * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the (potentially truncated) MAC
  * length of the specific algorithm is equal to or larger then the wildcard
  * algorithm's minimum MAC length.
  *
  * \note    When setting the minimum required MAC length to less than the
  *          smallest MAC length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively
  *          becomes an 'any-MAC-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm.
  *
  * \param mac_alg         A MAC algorithm identifier (value of type
  *                        #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(\p mac_alg)
  *                        is true).
  * \param min_mac_length  Desired minimum length of the message authentication
  *                        code in bytes. This must be at most the untruncated
  *                        length of the MAC and must be at least 1.
  *
  * \return                The corresponding MAC wildcard algorithm with the
  *                        specified minimum length.
  * \return                Unspecified if \p mac_alg is not a supported MAC
  *                        algorithm or if \p min_mac_length is less than 1 or
  *                        too large for the specified MAC algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length)   \
     (PSA_ALG_TRUNCATED_MAC(mac_alg, min_mac_length) |              \
      PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE                 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00000)
 /** The CBC-MAC construction over a block cipher
  *
  * \warning CBC-MAC is insecure in many cases.
  * A more secure mode, such as #PSA_ALG_CMAC, is recommended.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_CBC_MAC                         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00100)
 /** The CMAC construction over a block cipher */
 #define PSA_ALG_CMAC                            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x03c00200)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a MAC algorithm based on a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_BLOCK_CIPHER_MAC(alg)                                \
     (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_MAC_SUBCATEGORY_MASK)) == \
      PSA_ALG_CIPHER_MAC_BASE)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG              ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000)
 #define PSA_ALG_CIPHER_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a stream cipher.
  *
  * A stream cipher is a symmetric cipher that encrypts or decrypts messages
  * by applying a bitwise-xor with a stream of bytes that is generated
  * from a key.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a stream cipher algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier or if it is not a symmetric cipher algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_STREAM_CIPHER(alg)            \
     (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG)) == \
      (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_CIPHER | PSA_ALG_CIPHER_STREAM_FLAG))
 
 /** The stream cipher mode of a stream cipher algorithm.
  *
  * The underlying stream cipher is determined by the key type.
  * - To use ChaCha20, use a key type of #PSA_KEY_TYPE_CHACHA20.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_STREAM_CIPHER                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04800100)
 
 /** The CTR stream cipher mode.
  *
  * CTR is a stream cipher which is built from a block cipher.
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
  * For example, to use AES-128-CTR, use this algorithm with
  * a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_AES and a length of 128 bits (16 bytes).
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_CTR                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01000)
 
 /** The CFB stream cipher mode.
  *
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_CFB                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01100)
 
 /** The OFB stream cipher mode.
  *
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_OFB                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01200)
 
 /** The XTS cipher mode.
  *
  * XTS is a cipher mode which is built from a block cipher. It requires at
  * least one full block of input, but beyond this minimum the input
  * does not need to be a whole number of blocks.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_XTS                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0440ff00)
 
 /** The Electronic Code Book (ECB) mode of a block cipher, with no padding.
  *
  * \warning ECB mode does not protect the confidentiality of the encrypted data
  * except in extremely narrow circumstances. It is recommended that applications
  * only use ECB if they need to construct an operating mode that the
  * implementation does not provide. Implementations are encouraged to provide
  * the modes that applications need in preference to supporting direct access
  * to ECB.
  *
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
  *
  * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths are a
  * multiple of the block size of the chosen block cipher.
  *
  * ECB mode does not accept an initialization vector (IV). When using a
  * multi-part cipher operation with this algorithm, psa_cipher_generate_iv()
  * and psa_cipher_set_iv() must not be called.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_ECB_NO_PADDING                  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404400)
 
 /** The CBC block cipher chaining mode, with no padding.
  *
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
  *
  * This symmetric cipher mode can only be used with messages whose lengths
  * are whole number of blocks for the chosen block cipher.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_CBC_NO_PADDING                  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404000)
 
 /** The CBC block cipher chaining mode with PKCS#7 padding.
  *
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
  *
  * This is the padding method defined by PKCS#7 (RFC 2315) &sect;10.3.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_CBC_PKCS7                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04404100)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00400000)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an AEAD mode on a block cipher.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is an AEAD algorithm which is an AEAD mode based on
  *         a block cipher, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD_ON_BLOCK_CIPHER(alg)    \
     (((alg) & (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG)) == \
      (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_AEAD | PSA_ALG_AEAD_FROM_BLOCK_FLAG))
 
 /** The CCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
  *
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_CCM                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500100)
 
 /** The CCM* cipher mode without authentication.
  *
  * This is CCM* as specified in IEEE 802.15.4 §7, with a tag length of 0.
  * For CCM* with a nonzero tag length, use the AEAD algorithm #PSA_ALG_CCM.
  *
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
  *
  * Currently only 13-byte long IV's are supported.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_CCM_STAR_NO_TAG                 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x04c01300)
 
 /** The GCM authenticated encryption algorithm.
  *
  * The underlying block cipher is determined by the key type.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_GCM                             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05500200)
 
 /** The Chacha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm.
  *
  * The ChaCha20_Poly1305 construction is defined in RFC 7539.
  *
  * Implementations must support 12-byte nonces, may support 8-byte nonces,
  * and should reject other sizes.
  *
  * Implementations must support 16-byte tags and should reject other sizes.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305               ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x05100500)
 
 /* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bits corresponding to
  * PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK encode the length of the AEAD tag.
  * The constants for default lengths follow this encoding.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x003f0000)
 #define PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET 16
 
 /* In the encoding of an AEAD algorithm, the bit corresponding to
  * #PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG encodes the fact that the algorithm
  * is a wildcard algorithm. A key with such wildcard algorithm as permitted
  * algorithm policy can be used with any algorithm corresponding to the
  * same base class and having a tag length greater than or equal to the one
  * encoded in #PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK. */
 #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00008000)
 
 /** Macro to build a shortened AEAD algorithm.
  *
  * A shortened AEAD algorithm is similar to the corresponding AEAD
  * algorithm, but has an authentication tag that consists of fewer bytes.
  * Depending on the algorithm, the tag length may affect the calculation
  * of the ciphertext.
  *
  * \param aead_alg      An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
  *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg)
  *                      is true).
  * \param tag_length    Desired length of the authentication tag in bytes.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the specified
  *                      length.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
  *                      AEAD algorithm or if \p tag_length is not valid
  *                      for the specified AEAD algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, tag_length)           \
     (((aead_alg) & ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK |                     \
                      PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)) |         \
      ((tag_length) << PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET &                      \
         PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK))
 
 /** Retrieve the tag length of a specified AEAD algorithm
  *
  * \param aead_alg      An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
  *                      #psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg)
  *                      is true).
  *
  * \return              The tag length specified by the input algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
  *                      AEAD algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_GET_TAG_LENGTH(aead_alg)                           \
     (((aead_alg) & PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK) >>                     \
      PSA_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_OFFSET)
 
 /** Calculate the corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default tag length.
  *
  * \param aead_alg      An AEAD algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true).
  *
  * \return              The corresponding AEAD algorithm with the default
  *                      tag length for that algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg)                   \
     (                                                                    \
         PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CCM) \
         PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_GCM) \
         PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, PSA_ALG_CHACHA20_POLY1305) \
         0)
 #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_DEFAULT_LENGTH_TAG_CASE(aead_alg, ref)         \
     PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, 0) ==                      \
     PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(ref, 0) ?                            \
     ref :
 
 /** Macro to build an AEAD minimum-tag-length wildcard algorithm.
  *
  * A minimum-tag-length AEAD wildcard algorithm permits all AEAD algorithms
  * sharing the same base algorithm, and where the tag length of the specific
  * algorithm is equal to or larger then the minimum tag length specified by the
  * wildcard algorithm.
  *
  * \note    When setting the minimum required tag length to less than the
  *          smallest tag length allowed by the base algorithm, this effectively
  *          becomes an 'any-tag-length-allowed' policy for that base algorithm.
  *
  * \param aead_alg        An AEAD algorithm identifier (value of type
  *                        #psa_algorithm_t such that
  *                        #PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(\p aead_alg) is true).
  * \param min_tag_length  Desired minimum length of the authentication tag in
  *                        bytes. This must be at least 1 and at most the largest
  *                        allowed tag length of the algorithm.
  *
  * \return                The corresponding AEAD wildcard algorithm with the
  *                        specified minimum length.
  * \return                Unspecified if \p aead_alg is not a supported
  *                        AEAD algorithm or if \p min_tag_length is less than 1
  *                        or too large for the specified AEAD algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) \
     (PSA_ALG_AEAD_WITH_SHORTENED_TAG(aead_alg, min_tag_length) |            \
      PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000200)
 /** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature with hashing.
  *
  * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
  * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
  * RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
  *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signature algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(hash_alg)                             \
     (PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 /** Raw PKCS#1 v1.5 signature.
  *
  * The input to this algorithm is the DigestInfo structure used by
  * RFC 8017 (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications), &sect;9.2
  * steps 3&ndash;6.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg)                               \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_BASE)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE               ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000300)
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE      ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06001300)
 /** RSA PSS signature with hashing.
  *
  * This is the signature scheme defined by RFC 8017
  * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
  * RSASSA-PSS, with the message generation function MGF1, and with
  * a salt length equal to the length of the hash, or the largest
  * possible salt length for the algorithm and key size if that is
  * smaller than the hash length. The specified hash algorithm is
  * used to hash the input message, to create the salted hash, and
  * for the mask generation.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
  *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(hash_alg)                               \
     (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 /** RSA PSS signature with hashing with relaxed verification.
  *
  * This algorithm has the same behavior as #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS when signing,
  * but allows an arbitrary salt length (including \c 0) when verifying a
  * signature.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
  *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding RSA PSS signature algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(hash_alg)                      \
     (PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with standard salt.
  *
  * \param alg           An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
  *
  * \return              1 if \p alg is of the form
  *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg),
  *                      where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
  *                      #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
  *                      This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
  *                      a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg)                   \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_BASE)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS with any salt.
  *
  * \param alg           An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
  *
  * \return              1 if \p alg is of the form
  *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
  *                      where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
  *                      #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
  *                      This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
  *                      a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg)                                \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is RSA PSS.
  *
  * This includes any of the RSA PSS algorithm variants, regardless of the
  * constraints on salt length.
  *
  * \param alg           An algorithm value or an algorithm policy wildcard.
  *
  * \return              1 if \p alg is of the form
  *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS(\c hash_alg) or
  *                      #PSA_ALG_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT_BASE(\c hash_alg),
  *                      where \c hash_alg is a hash algorithm or
  *                      #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH. 0 otherwise.
  *                      This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not
  *                      a supported algorithm identifier or policy.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg)                                 \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_STANDARD_SALT(alg) ||                   \
      PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS_ANY_SALT(alg))
 
 #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE                      ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000600)
 /** ECDSA signature with hashing.
  *
  * This is the ECDSA signature scheme defined by ANSI X9.62,
  * with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
  *
  * The representation of the signature as a byte string consists of
  * the concatenation of the signature values *r* and *s*. Each of
  * *r* and *s* is encoded as an *N*-octet string, where *N* is the length
  * of the base point of the curve in octets. Each value is represented
  * in big-endian order (most significant octet first).
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
  *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding ECDSA signature algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA(hash_alg)                                 \
     (PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 /** ECDSA signature without hashing.
  *
  * This is the same signature scheme as #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(), but
  * without specifying a hash algorithm. This algorithm may only be
  * used to sign or verify a sequence of bytes that should be an
  * already-calculated hash. Note that the input is padded with
  * zeros on the left or truncated on the left as required to fit
  * the curve size.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE
 #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000700)
 /** Deterministic ECDSA signature with hashing.
  *
  * This is the deterministic ECDSA signature scheme defined by RFC 6979.
  *
  * The representation of a signature is the same as with #PSA_ALG_ECDSA().
  *
  * Note that when this algorithm is used for verification, signatures
  * made with randomized ECDSA (#PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg)) with the
  * same private key are accepted. In other words,
  * #PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) differs from
  * #PSA_ALG_ECDSA(\p hash_alg) only for signature, not for verification.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
  *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding deterministic ECDSA signature
  *                      algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(hash_alg)                           \
     (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00000100)
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg)                                           \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) ==  \
      PSA_ALG_ECDSA_BASE)
 #define PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)             \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_ECDSA(alg)                             \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_ECDSA(alg)                                \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_ECDSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
 
 /** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm without prehashing (PureEdDSA),
  * using standard parameters.
  *
  * Contexts are not supported in the current version of this specification
  * because there is no suitable signature interface that can take the
  * context as a parameter. A future version of this specification may add
  * suitable functions and extend this algorithm to support contexts.
  *
  * PureEdDSA requires an elliptic curve key on a twisted Edwards curve.
  * In this specification, the following curves are supported:
  * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 255-bit: Ed25519 as specified
  *   in RFC 8032.
  *   The curve is Edwards25519.
  *   The hash function used internally is SHA-512.
  * - #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_TWISTED_EDWARDS, 448-bit: Ed448 as specified
  *   in RFC 8032.
  *   The curve is Edwards448.
  *   The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the
  *   SHAKE256 output.
  *
  * This algorithm can be used with psa_sign_message() and
  * psa_verify_message(). Since there is no prehashing, it cannot be used
  * with psa_sign_hash() or psa_verify_hash().
  *
  * The signature format is the concatenation of R and S as defined by
  * RFC 8032 §5.1.6 and §5.2.6 (a 64-byte string for Ed25519, a 114-byte
  * string for Ed448).
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA                      ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000800)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE                 ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000900)
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg)              \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE)
 
 /** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA),
  * using SHA-512 and the Edwards25519 curve.
  *
  * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format.
  *
  * This algorithm is Ed25519 as specified in RFC 8032.
  * The curve is Edwards25519.
  * The prehash is SHA-512.
  * The hash function used internally is SHA-512.
  *
  * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature,
  * you can either:
  * - call psa_sign_message() on the message;
  * - or calculate the SHA-512 hash of the message
  *   with psa_hash_compute()
  *   or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(),
  *   using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHA_512,
  *   then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().
  * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or
  * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_ED25519PH                               \
     (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHA_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 /** Edwards-curve digital signature algorithm with prehashing (HashEdDSA),
  * using SHAKE256 and the Edwards448 curve.
  *
  * See #PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA regarding context support and the signature format.
  *
  * This algorithm is Ed448 as specified in RFC 8032.
  * The curve is Edwards448.
  * The prehash is the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output.
  * The hash function used internally is the first 114 bytes of the
  * SHAKE256 output.
  *
  * This is a hash-and-sign algorithm: to calculate a signature,
  * you can either:
  * - call psa_sign_message() on the message;
  * - or calculate the first 64 bytes of the SHAKE256 output of the message
  *   with psa_hash_compute()
  *   or with a multi-part hash operation started with psa_hash_setup(),
  *   using the hash algorithm #PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512,
  *   then sign the calculated hash with psa_sign_hash().
  * Verifying a signature is similar, using psa_verify_message() or
  * psa_verify_hash() instead of the signature function.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_ED448PH                                 \
     (PSA_ALG_HASH_EDDSA_BASE | (PSA_ALG_SHAKE256_512 & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 /* Default definition, to be overridden if the library is extended with
  * more hash-and-sign algorithms that we want to keep out of this header
  * file. */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) 0
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
  * with psa_sign_hash() and psa_verify_hash().
  *
  * This encompasses all strict hash-and-sign algorithms categorized by
  * PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(), as well as algorithms that follow the
  * paradigm more loosely:
  * - #PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN_RAW (expects its input to be an encoded hash)
  * - #PSA_ALG_ECDSA_ANY (doesn't specify what kind of hash the input is)
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
  *         hash. 0 if alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
  *         to sign a message. 0 if alg is not a signature algorithm.
  *         This macro can return either 0 or 1 if alg is not a
  *         supported algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg)                                       \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PSS(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_PKCS1V15_SIGN(alg) ||    \
      PSA_ALG_IS_ECDSA(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_EDDSA(alg) ||             \
      PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg))
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a signature algorithm that can be used
  * with psa_sign_message() and psa_verify_message().
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if alg is a signature algorithm that can be used to sign a
  *         message. 0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that can only be used
  *         to sign an already-calculated hash. 0 if \p alg is not a signature
  *         algorithm. This macro can return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a
  *         supported algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_MESSAGE(alg)                                    \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) || (alg) == PSA_ALG_PURE_EDDSA)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a hash-and-sign algorithm.
  *
  * Hash-and-sign algorithms are asymmetric (public-key) signature algorithms
  * structured in two parts: first the calculation of a hash in a way that
  * does not depend on the key, then the calculation of a signature from the
  * hash value and the key. Hash-and-sign algorithms encode the hash
  * used for the hashing step, and you can call #PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH
  * to extract this algorithm.
  *
  * Thus, for a hash-and-sign algorithm,
  * `psa_sign_message(key, alg, input, ...)` is equivalent to
  * ```
  * psa_hash_compute(PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg), input, ..., hash, ...);
  * psa_sign_hash(key, alg, hash, ..., signature, ...);
  * ```
  * Most usefully, separating the hash from the signature allows the hash
  * to be calculated in multiple steps with psa_hash_setup(), psa_hash_update()
  * and psa_hash_finish(). Likewise psa_verify_message() is equivalent to
  * calculating the hash and then calling psa_verify_hash().
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a hash-and-sign algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)                                   \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN_HASH(alg) &&                                       \
      ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) != 0)
 
 /** Get the hash used by a hash-and-sign signature algorithm.
  *
  * A hash-and-sign algorithm is a signature algorithm which is
  * composed of two phases: first a hashing phase which does not use
  * the key and produces a hash of the input message, then a signing
  * phase which only uses the hash and the key and not the message
  * itself.
  *
  * \param alg   A signature algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *              #PSA_ALG_IS_SIGN(\p alg) is true).
  *
  * \return      The underlying hash algorithm if \p alg is a hash-and-sign
  *              algorithm.
  * \return      0 if \p alg is a signature algorithm that does not
  *              follow the hash-and-sign structure.
  * \return      Unspecified if \p alg is not a signature algorithm or
  *              if it is not supported by the implementation.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg)                                     \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ?                                   \
      ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH :             \
      0)
 
 /** RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 encryption.
  *
  * \warning     Calling psa_asymmetric_decrypt() with this algorithm as a
  *              parameter is considered an inherently dangerous function
  *              (CWE-242). Unless it is used in a side channel free and safe
  *              way (eg. implementing the TLS protocol as per 7.4.7.1 of
  *              RFC 5246), the calling code is vulnerable.
  *
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT              ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000200)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x07000300)
 /** RSA OAEP encryption.
  *
  * This is the encryption scheme defined by RFC 8017
  * (PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications) under the name
  * RSAES-OAEP, with the message generation function MGF1.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      The hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true) to use
  *                      for MGF1.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding RSA OAEP encryption algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP(hash_alg)                              \
     (PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg)                                \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_BASE)
 #define PSA_ALG_RSA_OAEP_GET_HASH(alg)                          \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_RSA_OAEP(alg) ?                                 \
      ((alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH :      \
      0)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000100)
 /** Macro to build an HKDF algorithm.
  *
  * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is HKDF using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt used in the "extract" step.
  *   It is optional; if omitted, the derivation uses an empty salt.
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key used in the "extract" step.
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string used in the "expand" step.
  * You must pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT before #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET.
  * You may pass #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO at any time after steup and before
  * starting to generate output.
  *
  *  \warning  HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
  *  if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
  *  pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
  *  for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
  *  unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *
  * \return              The corresponding HKDF algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF(hash_alg)                                  \
     (PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF algorithm.
  *
  * HKDF is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based on a hash
  * function and the HMAC construction.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF(alg)                            \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE)
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg)                         \
     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000400)
 /** Macro to build an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
  *
  * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
  * HKDF-Extract using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
  *  - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
  *  - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the input keying material used in the
  *    "extract" step.
  * The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
  * Each input may only be passed once.
  *
  *  \warning HKDF-Extract is not meant to be used on its own. PSA_ALG_HKDF
  *  should be used instead if possible. PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT is provided
  *  as a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a
  *  building block. It may also be a slight performance optimization
  *  in applications that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many
  *  different info strings.
  *
  *  \warning  HKDF processes the salt as follows: first hash it with hash_alg
  *  if the salt is longer than the block size of the hash algorithm; then
  *  pad with null bytes up to the block size. As a result, it is possible
  *  for distinct salt inputs to result in the same outputs. To ensure
  *  unique outputs, it is recommended to use a fixed length for salt values.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *
  * \return              The corresponding HKDF-Extract algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT(hash_alg)                                  \
     (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Extract algorithm.
  *
  * HKDF-Extract is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
  * on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Extract algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXTRACT(alg)                            \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE                       ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000500)
 /** Macro to build an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
  *
  * For example, `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` is
  * HKDF-Expand using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs:
  *  - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the pseudorandom key (PRK).
  *  - PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO is the info string.
  *
  *  The inputs are mandatory and must be passed in the order above.
  *  Each input may only be passed once.
  *
  *  \warning HKDF-Expand is not meant to be used on its own. `PSA_ALG_HKDF`
  *  should be used instead if possible. `PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND` is provided as
  *  a separate algorithm for the sake of protocols that use it as a building
  *  block. It may also be a slight performance optimization in applications
  *  that use HKDF with the same salt and key but many different info strings.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *
  * \return              The corresponding HKDF-Expand algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND(hash_alg)                                  \
     (PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF-Expand algorithm.
  *
  * HKDF-Expand is a family of key derivation algorithms that are based
  * on a hash function and the HMAC construction.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is an HKDF-Expand algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_HKDF_EXPAND(alg)                            \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an HKDF or HKDF-Extract or
  *  HKDF-Expand algorithm.
  *
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is any HKDF type algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_ANY_HKDF(alg)                                   \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_BASE ||          \
      ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXTRACT_BASE ||  \
      ((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_HKDF_EXPAND_BASE)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE                  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000200)
 /** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
  *
  * TLS 1.2 uses a custom pseudorandom function (PRF) for key schedule,
  * specified in Section 5 of RFC 5246. It is based on HMAC and can be
  * used with either SHA-256 or SHA-384.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
  * passed in the order given here:
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
  *
  * For the application to TLS-1.2 key expansion, the seed is the
  * concatenation of ServerHello.Random + ClientHello.Random,
  * and the label is "key expansion".
  *
  * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
  * TLS 1.2 PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *
  * \return              The corresponding TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF(hash_alg)                                  \
     (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PRF algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PRF(alg)                                    \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_BASE)
 #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PRF_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg)                         \
     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000300)
 /** Macro to build a TLS-1.2 PSK-to-MasterSecret algorithm.
  *
  * In a pure-PSK handshake in TLS 1.2, the master secret is derived
  * from the PreSharedKey (PSK) through the application of padding
  * (RFC 4279, Section 2) and the TLS-1.2 PRF (RFC 5246, Section 5).
  * The latter is based on HMAC and can be used with either SHA-256
  * or SHA-384.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
  * passed in the order given here:
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED is the seed.
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET is the other secret for the
  *   computation of the premaster secret. This input is optional;
  *   if omitted, it defaults to a string of null bytes with the same length
  *   as the secret (PSK) input.
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the secret key.
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL is the label.
  *
  * For the application to TLS-1.2, the seed (which is
  * forwarded to the TLS-1.2 PRF) is the concatenation of the
  * ClientHello.Random + ServerHello.Random,
  * the label is "master secret" or "extended master secret" and
  * the other secret depends on the key exchange specified in the cipher suite:
  * - for a plain PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 2), omit
  *   PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET
  * - for a DHE-PSK (RFC 4279, Section 3) or ECDHE-PSK cipher suite
  *   (RFC 5489, Section 2), the other secret should be the output of the
  *   PSA_ALG_FFDH or PSA_ALG_ECDH key agreement performed with the peer.
  *   The recommended way to pass this input is to use a key derivation
  *   algorithm constructed as
  *   PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg))
  *   and to call psa_key_derivation_key_agreement(). Alternatively,
  *   this input may be an output of `psa_raw_key_agreement()` passed with
  *   psa_key_derivation_input_bytes(), or an equivalent input passed with
  *   psa_key_derivation_input_bytes() or psa_key_derivation_input_key().
  * - for a RSA-PSK cipher suite (RFC 4279, Section 4), the other secret
  *   should be the 48-byte client challenge (the PreMasterSecret of
  *   (RFC 5246, Section 7.4.7.1)) concatenation of the TLS version and
  *   a 46-byte random string chosen by the client. On the server, this is
  *   typically an output of psa_asymmetric_decrypt() using
  *   PSA_ALG_RSA_PKCS1V15_CRYPT, passed to the key derivation operation
  *   with `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
  *
  * For example, `PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` represents the
  * TLS-1.2 PSK to MasterSecret derivation PRF using HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *
  * \return              The corresponding TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(hash_alg)                                  \
     (PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is a TLS-1.2 PSK to MS algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS(alg)                                    \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_BASE)
 #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_PSK_TO_MS_GET_HASH(hkdf_alg)                         \
     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((hkdf_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 /* The TLS 1.2 ECJPAKE-to-PMS KDF. It takes the shared secret K (an EC point
  * in case of EC J-PAKE) and calculates SHA256(K.X) that the rest of TLS 1.2
  * will use to derive the session secret, as defined by step 2 of
  * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-cragie-tls-ecjpake-01#section-8.7.
  * Uses PSA_ALG_SHA_256.
  * This function takes a single input:
  * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is the shared secret K from EC J-PAKE.
  * The only supported curve is secp256r1 (the 256-bit curve in
  * #PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1), so the input must be exactly 65 bytes.
  * The output has to be read as a single chunk of 32 bytes, defined as
  * PSA_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS_DATA_SIZE.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_TLS12_ECJPAKE_TO_PMS            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08000609)
 
 /* This flag indicates whether the key derivation algorithm is suitable for
  * use on low-entropy secrets such as password - these algorithms are also
  * known as key stretching or password hashing schemes. These are also the
  * algorithms that accepts inputs of type #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD.
  *
  * Those algorithms cannot be combined with a key agreement algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_STRETCHING_FLAG  ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x00800000)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE                ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800100)
 /** Macro to build a PBKDF2-HMAC password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
  *
  * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
  * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using a PRF based on
  * HMAC with the specified hash.
  * For example, `PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(PSA_ALG_SHA_256)` specifies PBKDF2
  * using the PRF HMAC-SHA-256.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the following inputs, which must be
  * provided in the following order:
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST is the iteration count.
  *   This input step must be used exactly once.
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT is the salt.
  *   This input step must be used one or more times; if used several times, the
  *   inputs will be concatenated. This can be used to build the final salt
  *   from multiple sources, both public and secret (also known as pepper).
  * - #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD is the password to be hashed.
  *   This input step must be used exactly once.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *
  * \return              The corresponding PBKDF2-HMAC-XXX algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC(hash_alg)                                  \
     (PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is a PBKDF2-HMAC algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         key derivation algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(alg)                                    \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_BASE)
 #define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC_GET_HASH(pbkdf2_alg)                         \
     (PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_HASH | ((pbkdf2_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 /** The PBKDF2-AES-CMAC-PRF-128 password hashing / key stretching algorithm.
  *
  * PBKDF2 is defined by PKCS#5, republished as RFC 8018 (section 5.2).
  * This macro specifies the PBKDF2 algorithm constructed using the
  * AES-CMAC-PRF-128 PRF specified by RFC 4615.
  *
  * This key derivation algorithm uses the same inputs as
  * #PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_HMAC() with the same constraints.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128         ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x08800200)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2(kdf_alg)                                      \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_PBKDF2_HMAC(kdf_alg) || \
      ((kdf_alg) == PSA_ALG_PBKDF2_AES_CMAC_PRF_128))
 
 #define PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK             ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xfe00ffff)
 #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK              ((psa_algorithm_t) 0xffff0000)
 
 /** Macro to build a combined algorithm that chains a key agreement with
  * a key derivation.
  *
  * \param ka_alg        A key agreement algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
  *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(\p ka_alg) is true).
  * \param kdf_alg       A key derivation algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such
  *                      that #PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(\p kdf_alg) is true).
  *
  * \return              The corresponding key agreement and derivation
  *                      algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p ka_alg is not a supported
  *                      key agreement algorithm or \p kdf_alg is not a
  *                      supported key derivation algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT(ka_alg, kdf_alg)  \
     ((ka_alg) | (kdf_alg))
 
 #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg)                              \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_DERIVATION_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg)                             \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_MASK) | PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_AGREEMENT)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a raw key agreement algorithm.
  *
  * A raw key agreement algorithm is one that does not specify
  * a key derivation function.
  * Usually, raw key agreement algorithms are constructed directly with
  * a \c PSA_ALG_xxx macro while non-raw key agreement algorithms are
  * constructed with #PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT().
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a raw key agreement algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_RAW_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)                               \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg) &&                                   \
      PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_KDF(alg) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_KEY_DERIVATION)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION_OR_AGREEMENT(alg)     \
     ((PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_DERIVATION(alg) || PSA_ALG_IS_KEY_AGREEMENT(alg)))
 
 /** The finite-field Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement algorithm.
  *
  * The shared secret produced by key agreement is
  * `g^{ab}` in big-endian format.
  * It is `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where `m` is the size of the prime `p`
  * in bits.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_FFDH                            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09010000)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm.
  *
  * This includes the raw finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
  * finite-field Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
  * algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is a finite field Diffie-Hellman algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         key agreement algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_FFDH(alg) \
     (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_FFDH)
 
 /** The elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement algorithm.
  *
  * The shared secret produced by key agreement is the x-coordinate of
  * the shared secret point. It is always `ceiling(m / 8)` bytes long where
  * `m` is the bit size associated with the curve, i.e. the bit size of the
  * order of the curve's coordinate field. When `m` is not a multiple of 8,
  * the byte containing the most significant bit of the shared secret
  * is padded with zero bits. The byte order is either little-endian
  * or big-endian depending on the curve type.
  *
  * - For Montgomery curves (curve types `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_CURVEXXX`),
  *   the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
  *   in little-endian byte order.
  *   The bit size is 448 for Curve448 and 255 for Curve25519.
  * - For Weierstrass curves over prime fields (curve types
  *   `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECPXXX` and `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_BRAINPOOL_PXXX`),
  *   the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
  *   in big-endian byte order.
  *   The bit size is `m = ceiling(log_2(p))` for the field `F_p`.
  * - For Weierstrass curves over binary fields (curve types
  *   `PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECTXXX`),
  *   the shared secret is the x-coordinate of `d_A Q_B = d_B Q_A`
  *   in big-endian byte order.
  *   The bit size is `m` for the field `F_{2^m}`.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_ECDH                            ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x09020000)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman
  * algorithm.
  *
  * This includes the raw elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm as well as
  * elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman followed by any supporter key derivation
  * algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is an elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman algorithm,
  *         0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         key agreement algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_ECDH(alg) \
     (PSA_ALG_KEY_AGREEMENT_GET_BASE(alg) == PSA_ALG_ECDH)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm encoding is a wildcard.
  *
  * Wildcard values may only be used to set the usage algorithm field in
  * a policy, not to perform an operation.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \c alg is a wildcard algorithm encoding.
  * \return 0 if \c alg is a non-wildcard algorithm encoding (suitable for
  *         an operation).
  * \return This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \c alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_WILDCARD(alg)                            \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg) ?                        \
      PSA_ALG_SIGN_GET_HASH(alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH :       \
      PSA_ALG_IS_MAC(alg) ?                                  \
      (alg & PSA_ALG_MAC_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 :   \
      PSA_ALG_IS_AEAD(alg) ?                                 \
      (alg & PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG) != 0 :  \
      (alg) == PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH)
 
 /** Get the hash used by a composite algorithm.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return The underlying hash algorithm if alg is a composite algorithm that
  * uses a hash algorithm.
  *
  * \return \c 0 if alg is not a composite algorithm that uses a hash.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_GET_HASH(alg) \
     (((alg) & 0x000000ff) == 0 ? ((psa_algorithm_t) 0) : 0x02000000 | ((alg) & 0x000000ff))
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \defgroup key_lifetimes Key lifetimes
  * @{
  */
 
 /* Note that location and persistence level values are embedded in the
  * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
  * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
  */
 
 /** The default lifetime for volatile keys.
  *
  * A volatile key only exists as long as the identifier to it is not destroyed.
  * The key material is guaranteed to be erased on a power reset.
  *
  * A key with this lifetime is typically stored in the RAM area of the
  * PSA Crypto subsystem. However this is an implementation choice.
  * If an implementation stores data about the key in a non-volatile memory,
  * it must release all the resources associated with the key and erase the
  * key material if the calling application terminates.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE               ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000000)
 
 /** The default lifetime for persistent keys.
  *
  * A persistent key remains in storage until it is explicitly destroyed or
  * until the corresponding storage area is wiped. This specification does
  * not define any mechanism to wipe a storage area, but integrations may
  * provide their own mechanism (for example to perform a factory reset,
  * to prepare for device refurbishment, or to uninstall an application).
  *
  * This lifetime value is the default storage area for the calling
  * application. Integrations of Mbed TLS may support other persistent lifetimes.
  * See ::psa_key_lifetime_t for more information.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT             ((psa_key_lifetime_t) 0x00000001)
 
 /** The persistence level of volatile keys.
  *
  * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE            ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x00)
 
 /** The default persistence level for persistent keys.
  *
  * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT             ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0x01)
 
 /** A persistence level indicating that a key is never destroyed.
  *
  * See ::psa_key_persistence_t for more information.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY           ((psa_key_persistence_t) 0xff)
 
 #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime)      \
     ((psa_key_persistence_t) ((lifetime) & 0x000000ff))
 
 #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_LOCATION(lifetime)      \
     ((psa_key_location_t) ((lifetime) >> 8))
 
 /** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is volatile.
  *
  * A volatile key is automatically destroyed by the implementation when
  * the application instance terminates. In particular, a volatile key
  * is automatically destroyed on a power reset of the device.
  *
  * A key that is not volatile is persistent. Persistent keys are
  * preserved until the application explicitly destroys them or until an
  * implementation-specific device management event occurs (for example,
  * a factory reset).
  *
  * \param lifetime      The lifetime value to query (value of type
  *                      ::psa_key_lifetime_t).
  *
  * \return \c 1 if the key is volatile, otherwise \c 0.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_VOLATILE(lifetime)  \
     (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \
      PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_VOLATILE)
 
 /** Whether a key lifetime indicates that the key is read-only.
  *
  * Read-only keys cannot be created or destroyed through the PSA Crypto API.
  * They must be created through platform-specific means that bypass the API.
  *
  * Some platforms may offer ways to destroy read-only keys. For example,
  * consider a platform with multiple levels of privilege, where a
  * low-privilege application can use a key but is not allowed to destroy
  * it, and the platform exposes the key to the application with a read-only
  * lifetime. High-privilege code can destroy the key even though the
  * application sees the key as read-only.
  *
  * \param lifetime      The lifetime value to query (value of type
  *                      ::psa_key_lifetime_t).
  *
  * \return \c 1 if the key is read-only, otherwise \c 0.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_IS_READ_ONLY(lifetime)  \
     (PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_GET_PERSISTENCE(lifetime) == \
      PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_READ_ONLY)
 
 /** Construct a lifetime from a persistence level and a location.
  *
  * \param persistence   The persistence level
  *                      (value of type ::psa_key_persistence_t).
  * \param location      The location indicator
  *                      (value of type ::psa_key_location_t).
  *
  * \return The constructed lifetime value.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_FROM_PERSISTENCE_AND_LOCATION(persistence, location) \
     ((location) << 8 | (persistence))
 
 /** The local storage area for persistent keys.
  *
  * This storage area is available on all systems that can store persistent
  * keys without delegating the storage to a third-party cryptoprocessor.
  *
  * See ::psa_key_location_t for more information.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_LOCAL_STORAGE          ((psa_key_location_t) 0x000000)
 
 #define PSA_KEY_LOCATION_VENDOR_FLAG            ((psa_key_location_t) 0x800000)
 
 /* Note that key identifier values are embedded in the
  * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
  * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
  */
 
 /** The null key identifier.
  */
 /* *INDENT-OFF* (https://github.com/ARM-software/psa-arch-tests/issues/337) */
 #define PSA_KEY_ID_NULL                         ((psa_key_id_t)0)
 /* *INDENT-ON* */
 /** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MIN                     ((psa_key_id_t) 0x00000001)
 /** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the application.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_ID_USER_MAX                     ((psa_key_id_t) 0x3fffffff)
 /** The minimum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN                   ((psa_key_id_t) 0x40000000)
 /** The maximum value for a key identifier chosen by the implementation.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX                   ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffffff)
 
 
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER)
 
 #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((psa_key_id_t) 0)
 #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) (id)
 #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) (0)
 
 /** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime.
  *
  * \param unused  Unused parameter.
  * \param key_id  Identifier of the key.
  */
 static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(
     unsigned int unused, psa_key_id_t key_id)
 {
     (void) unused;
 
     return key_id;
 }
 
 /** Compare two key identifiers.
  *
  * \param id1 First key identifier.
  * \param id2 Second key identifier.
  *
  * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise.
  */
 static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1,
                                            mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2)
 {
     return id1 == id2;
 }
 
 /** Check whether a key identifier is null.
  *
  * \param key Key identifier.
  *
  * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise.
  */
 static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
 {
     return key == 0;
 }
 
 #else /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
 
 #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_INIT ((mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ 0, 0 })
 #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id))
 #define MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(id) ((id).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner))
 
 /** Utility to initialize a key identifier at runtime.
  *
  * \param owner_id Identifier of the key owner.
  * \param key_id   Identifier of the key.
  */
 static inline mbedtls_svc_key_id_t mbedtls_svc_key_id_make(
     mbedtls_key_owner_id_t owner_id, psa_key_id_t key_id)
 {
     return (mbedtls_svc_key_id_t){ .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) = key_id,
                                    .MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner) = owner_id };
 }
 
 /** Compare two key identifiers.
  *
  * \param id1 First key identifier.
  * \param id2 Second key identifier.
  *
  * \return Non-zero if the two key identifier are equal, zero otherwise.
  */
 static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_equal(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id1,
                                            mbedtls_svc_key_id_t id2)
 {
     return (id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id)) &&
            mbedtls_key_owner_id_equal(id1.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner), id2.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(owner));
 }
 
 /** Check whether a key identifier is null.
  *
  * \param key Key identifier.
  *
  * \return Non-zero if the key identifier is null, zero otherwise.
  */
 static inline int mbedtls_svc_key_id_is_null(mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key)
 {
     return key.MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(key_id) == 0;
 }
 
 #endif /* !MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER */
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \defgroup policy Key policies
  * @{
  */
 
 /* Note that key usage flags are embedded in the
  * persistent key store, as part of key metadata. As a consequence, they
  * must not be changed (unless the storage format version changes).
  */
 
 /** Whether the key may be exported.
  *
  * A public key or the public part of a key pair may always be exported
  * regardless of the value of this permission flag.
  *
  * If a key does not have export permission, implementations shall not
  * allow the key to be exported in plain form from the cryptoprocessor,
  * whether through psa_export_key() or through a proprietary interface.
  * The key may however be exportable in a wrapped form, i.e. in a form
  * where it is encrypted by another key.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT                    ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000001)
 
 /** Whether the key may be copied.
  *
  * This flag allows the use of psa_copy_key() to make a copy of the key
  * with the same policy or a more restrictive policy.
  *
  * For lifetimes for which the key is located in a secure element which
  * enforce the non-exportability of keys, copying a key outside the secure
  * element also requires the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_EXPORT.
  * Copying the key inside the secure element is permitted with just
  * #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY if the secure element supports it.
  * For keys with the lifetime #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_VOLATILE or
  * #PSA_KEY_LIFETIME_PERSISTENT, the usage flag #PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY
  * is sufficient to permit the copy.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_COPY                      ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000002)
 
 /** Whether the key may be used to encrypt a message.
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric encryption operation,
  * for an AEAD encryption-and-authentication operation,
  * or for an asymmetric encryption operation,
  * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
  *
  * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_ENCRYPT                   ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000100)
 
 /** Whether the key may be used to decrypt a message.
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used for a symmetric decryption operation,
  * for an AEAD decryption-and-verification operation,
  * or for an asymmetric decryption operation,
  * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
  *
  * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DECRYPT                   ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000200)
 
 /** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation or for
  * an asymmetric message signature operation, if otherwise permitted by the
  * key’s type and policy.
  *
  * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_MESSAGE              ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000400)
 
 /** Whether the key may be used to verify a message.
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation or for
  * an asymmetric message signature verification operation, if otherwise
  * permitted by the key’s type and policy.
  *
  * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_MESSAGE            ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00000800)
 
 /** Whether the key may be used to sign a message.
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC calculation operation
  * or for an asymmetric signature operation,
  * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
  *
  * For a key pair, this concerns the private key.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_SIGN_HASH                 ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00001000)
 
 /** Whether the key may be used to verify a message signature.
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used for a MAC verification operation
  * or for an asymmetric signature verification operation,
  * if otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
  *
  * For a key pair, this concerns the public key.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_HASH               ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00002000)
 
 /** Whether the key may be used to derive other keys or produce a password
  * hash.
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used for a key derivation operation or for
  * a key agreement operation, if otherwise permitted by the key's type and
  * policy.
  *
  * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
  * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it
  * permits calling psa_key_derivation_output_bytes() or
  * psa_key_derivation_output_key() at the end of the operation.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE                    ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00004000)
 
 /** Whether the key may be used to verify the result of a key derivation,
  * including password hashing.
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used:
  *
  * This flag allows the key to be used in a key derivation operation, if
  * otherwise permitted by the key's type and policy.
  *
  * If this flag is present on all keys used in calls to
  * psa_key_derivation_input_key() for a key derivation operation, then it
  * permits calling psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes() or
  * psa_key_derivation_verify_key() at the end of the operation.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_USAGE_VERIFY_DERIVATION         ((psa_key_usage_t) 0x00008000)
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \defgroup derivation Key derivation
  * @{
  */
 
 /* Key input steps are not embedded in the persistent storage, so you can
  * change them if needed: it's only an ABI change. */
 
 /** A secret input for key derivation.
  *
  * This should be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE
  * (passed to psa_key_derivation_input_key())
  * or the shared secret resulting from a key agreement
  * (obtained via psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()).
  *
  * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
  * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
  * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
  * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(),
  * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or
  * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not
  * psa_key_derivation_output_key().
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET     ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0101)
 
 /** A low-entropy secret input for password hashing / key stretching.
  *
  * This is usually a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD (passed to
  * psa_key_derivation_input_key()) or a direct input (passed to
  * psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()) that is a password or passphrase. It can
  * also be high-entropy secret such as a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE or
  * the shared secret resulting from a key agreement.
  *
  * The secret can also be a direct input (passed to
  * key_derivation_input_bytes()). In this case, the derivation operation
  * may not be used to derive keys: the operation will only allow
  * psa_key_derivation_output_bytes(),
  * psa_key_derivation_verify_bytes(), or
  * psa_key_derivation_verify_key(), but not
  * psa_key_derivation_output_key().
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_PASSWORD   ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0102)
 
 /** A high-entropy additional secret input for key derivation.
  *
  * This is typically the shared secret resulting from a key agreement obtained
  * via `psa_key_derivation_key_agreement()`. It may alternatively be a key of
  * type `PSA_KEY_TYPE_DERIVE` passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_key()`, or
  * a direct input passed to `psa_key_derivation_input_bytes()`.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_OTHER_SECRET \
     ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0103)
 
 /** A label for key derivation.
  *
  * This should be a direct input.
  * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_LABEL      ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0201)
 
 /** A salt for key derivation.
  *
  * This should be a direct input.
  * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA or
  * #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PEPPER.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SALT       ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0202)
 
 /** An information string for key derivation.
  *
  * This should be a direct input.
  * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_INFO       ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0203)
 
 /** A seed for key derivation.
  *
  * This should be a direct input.
  * It can also be a key of type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_RAW_DATA.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SEED       ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0204)
 
 /** A cost parameter for password hashing / key stretching.
  *
  * This must be a direct input, passed to psa_key_derivation_input_integer().
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_COST       ((psa_key_derivation_step_t) 0x0205)
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \defgroup helper_macros Helper macros
  * @{
  */
 
 /* Helper macros */
 
 /** Check if two AEAD algorithm identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm
  *  regardless of the tag length they encode.
  *
  * \param aead_alg_1 An AEAD algorithm identifier.
  * \param aead_alg_2 An AEAD algorithm identifier.
  *
  * \return           1 if both identifiers refer to the same AEAD algorithm,
  *                   0 otherwise.
  *                   Unspecified if neither \p aead_alg_1 nor \p aead_alg_2 are
  *                   a supported AEAD algorithm.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_ALG_AEAD_EQUAL(aead_alg_1, aead_alg_2) \
     (!(((aead_alg_1) ^ (aead_alg_2)) & \
        ~(PSA_ALG_AEAD_TAG_LENGTH_MASK | PSA_ALG_AEAD_AT_LEAST_THIS_LENGTH_FLAG)))
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \defgroup interruptible Interruptible operations
  * @{
  */
 
 /** Maximum value for use with \c psa_interruptible_set_max_ops() to determine
  *  the maximum number of ops allowed to be executed by an interruptible
  *  function in a single call.
  */
 #define PSA_INTERRUPTIBLE_MAX_OPS_UNLIMITED UINT32_MAX
 
 /**@}*/
 
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_VALUES_H */

This page was automatically generated by the 2.3.7 LXR engine. The LXR team