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 /**
  * \file psa/crypto_extra.h
  *
  * \brief PSA cryptography module: Mbed TLS vendor extensions
  *
  * \note This file may not be included directly. Applications must
  * include psa/crypto.h.
  *
  * This file is reserved for vendor-specific definitions.
  */
 /*
  *  Copyright The Mbed TLS Contributors
  *  SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0 OR GPL-2.0-or-later
  */
 
 #ifndef PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H
 #define PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H
 #include "mbedtls/private_access.h"
 
 #include "crypto_types.h"
 #include "crypto_compat.h"
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 extern "C" {
 #endif
 
 /* UID for secure storage seed */
 #define PSA_CRYPTO_ITS_RANDOM_SEED_UID 0xFFFFFF52
 
 /* See mbedtls_config.h for definition */
 #if !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT)
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_SLOT_COUNT 32
 #endif
 
 /** \addtogroup attributes
  * @{
  */
 
 /** \brief Declare the enrollment algorithm for a key.
  *
  * An operation on a key may indifferently use the algorithm set with
  * psa_set_key_algorithm() or with this function.
  *
  * \param[out] attributes       The attribute structure to write to.
  * \param alg2                  A second algorithm that the key may be used
  *                              for, in addition to the algorithm set with
  *                              psa_set_key_algorithm().
  *
  * \warning Setting an enrollment algorithm is not recommended, because
  *          using the same key with different algorithms can allow some
  *          attacks based on arithmetic relations between different
  *          computations made with the same key, or can escalate harmless
  *          side channels into exploitable ones. Use this function only
  *          if it is necessary to support a protocol for which it has been
  *          verified that the usage of the key with multiple algorithms
  *          is safe.
  */
 static inline void psa_set_key_enrollment_algorithm(
     psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     psa_algorithm_t alg2)
 {
     attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2) = alg2;
 }
 
 /** Retrieve the enrollment algorithm policy from key attributes.
  *
  * \param[in] attributes        The key attribute structure to query.
  *
  * \return The enrollment algorithm stored in the attribute structure.
  */
 static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_get_key_enrollment_algorithm(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
 {
     return attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(policy).MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg2);
 }
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C)
 
 /** Retrieve the slot number where a key is stored.
  *
  * A slot number is only defined for keys that are stored in a secure
  * element.
  *
  * This information is only useful if the secure element is not entirely
  * managed through the PSA Cryptography API. It is up to the secure
  * element driver to decide how PSA slot numbers map to any other interface
  * that the secure element may have.
  *
  * \param[in] attributes        The key attribute structure to query.
  * \param[out] slot_number      On success, the slot number containing the key.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The key is located in a secure element, and \p *slot_number
  *         indicates the slot number that contains it.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The caller is not permitted to query the slot number.
  *         Mbed TLS currently does not return this error.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The key is not located in a secure element.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_get_key_slot_number(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     psa_key_slot_number_t *slot_number);
 
 /** Choose the slot number where a key is stored.
  *
  * This function declares a slot number in the specified attribute
  * structure.
  *
  * A slot number is only meaningful for keys that are stored in a secure
  * element. It is up to the secure element driver to decide how PSA slot
  * numbers map to any other interface that the secure element may have.
  *
  * \note Setting a slot number in key attributes for a key creation can
  *       cause the following errors when creating the key:
  *       - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED if the selected secure element does
  *         not support choosing a specific slot number.
  *       - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED if the caller is not permitted to
  *         choose slot numbers in general or to choose this specific slot.
  *       - #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT if the chosen slot number is not
  *         valid in general or not valid for this specific key.
  *       - #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS if there is already a key in the
  *         selected slot.
  *
  * \param[out] attributes       The attribute structure to write to.
  * \param slot_number           The slot number to set.
  */
 static inline void psa_set_key_slot_number(
     psa_key_attributes_t *attributes,
     psa_key_slot_number_t slot_number)
 {
     attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number) = 1;
     attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(slot_number) = slot_number;
 }
 
 /** Remove the slot number attribute from a key attribute structure.
  *
  * This function undoes the action of psa_set_key_slot_number().
  *
  * \param[out] attributes       The attribute structure to write to.
  */
 static inline void psa_clear_key_slot_number(
     psa_key_attributes_t *attributes)
 {
     attributes->MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(has_slot_number) = 0;
 }
 
 /** Register a key that is already present in a secure element.
  *
  * The key must be located in a secure element designated by the
  * lifetime field in \p attributes, in the slot set with
  * psa_set_key_slot_number() in the attribute structure.
  * This function makes the key available through the key identifier
  * specified in \p attributes.
  *
  * \param[in] attributes        The attributes of the existing key.
  *                              - The lifetime must be a persistent lifetime
  *                                in a secure element. Volatile lifetimes are
  *                                not currently supported.
  *                              - The key identifier must be in the valid
  *                                range for persistent keys.
  *                              - The key type and size must be specified and
  *                                must be consistent with the key material
  *                                in the secure element.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The key was successfully registered.
  *         Note that depending on the design of the driver, this may or may
  *         not guarantee that a key actually exists in the designated slot
  *         and is compatible with the specified attributes.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_ALREADY_EXISTS
  *         There is already a key with the identifier specified in
  *         \p attributes.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The secure element driver for the specified lifetime does not
  *         support registering a key.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The identifier in \p attributes is invalid, namely the identifier is
  *         not in the user range, or
  *         \p attributes specifies a lifetime which is not located
  *         in a secure element, or no slot number is specified in \p attributes,
  *         or the specified slot number is not valid.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The caller is not authorized to register the specified key slot.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_STORAGE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_register_se_key(
     const psa_key_attributes_t *attributes);
 
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_SE_C */
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /**
  * \brief Library deinitialization.
  *
  * This function clears all data associated with the PSA layer,
  * including the whole key store.
  * This function is not thread safe, it wipes every key slot regardless of
  * state and reader count. It should only be called when no slot is in use.
  *
  * This is an Mbed TLS extension.
  */
 void mbedtls_psa_crypto_free(void);
 
 /** \brief Statistics about
  * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore.
  *
  * \note The content of this structure is not part of the stable API and ABI
  *       of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version.
  */
 typedef struct mbedtls_psa_stats_s {
     /** Number of slots containing key material for a volatile key. */
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(volatile_slots);
     /** Number of slots containing key material for a key which is in
      * internal persistent storage. */
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(persistent_slots);
     /** Number of slots containing a reference to a key in a
      * secure element. */
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(external_slots);
     /** Number of slots which are occupied, but do not contain
      * key material yet. */
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(half_filled_slots);
     /** Number of slots that contain cache data. */
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cache_slots);
     /** Number of slots that are not used for anything. */
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(empty_slots);
     /** Number of slots that are locked. */
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(locked_slots);
     /** Largest key id value among open keys in internal persistent storage. */
     psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_internal_key_id);
     /** Largest key id value among open keys in secure elements. */
     psa_key_id_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(max_open_external_key_id);
 } mbedtls_psa_stats_t;
 
 /** \brief Get statistics about
  * resource consumption related to the PSA keystore.
  *
  * \note When Mbed TLS is built as part of a service, with isolation
  *       between the application and the keystore, the service may or
  *       may not expose this function.
  */
 void mbedtls_psa_get_stats(mbedtls_psa_stats_t *stats);
 
 /**
  * \brief Inject an initial entropy seed for the random generator into
  *        secure storage.
  *
  * This function injects data to be used as a seed for the random generator
  * used by the PSA Crypto implementation. On devices that lack a trusted
  * entropy source (preferably a hardware random number generator),
  * the Mbed PSA Crypto implementation uses this value to seed its
  * random generator.
  *
  * On devices without a trusted entropy source, this function must be
  * called exactly once in the lifetime of the device. On devices with
  * a trusted entropy source, calling this function is optional.
  * In all cases, this function may only be called before calling any
  * other function in the PSA Crypto API, including psa_crypto_init().
  *
  * When this function returns successfully, it populates a file in
  * persistent storage. Once the file has been created, this function
  * can no longer succeed.
  *
  * If any error occurs, this function does not change the system state.
  * You can call this function again after correcting the reason for the
  * error if possible.
  *
  * \warning This function **can** fail! Callers MUST check the return status.
  *
  * \warning If you use this function, you should use it as part of a
  *          factory provisioning process. The value of the injected seed
  *          is critical to the security of the device. It must be
  *          *secret*, *unpredictable* and (statistically) *unique per device*.
  *          You should be generate it randomly using a cryptographically
  *          secure random generator seeded from trusted entropy sources.
  *          You should transmit it securely to the device and ensure
  *          that its value is not leaked or stored anywhere beyond the
  *          needs of transmitting it from the point of generation to
  *          the call of this function, and erase all copies of the value
  *          once this function returns.
  *
  * This is an Mbed TLS extension.
  *
  * \note This function is only available on the following platforms:
  * * If the compile-time option MBEDTLS_PSA_INJECT_ENTROPY is enabled.
  *   Note that you must provide compatible implementations of
  *   mbedtls_nv_seed_read and mbedtls_nv_seed_write.
  * * In a client-server integration of PSA Cryptography, on the client side,
  *   if the server supports this feature.
  * \param[in] seed          Buffer containing the seed value to inject.
  * \param[in] seed_size     Size of the \p seed buffer.
  *                          The size of the seed in bytes must be greater
  *                          or equal to both #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_BLOCK_SIZE
  *                          and the value of \c MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MIN_PLATFORM
  *                          in `library/entropy_poll.h` in the Mbed TLS source
  *                          code.
  *                          It must be less or equal to
  *                          #MBEDTLS_ENTROPY_MAX_SEED_SIZE.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The seed value was injected successfully. The random generator
  *         of the PSA Crypto implementation is now ready for use.
  *         You may now call psa_crypto_init() and use the PSA Crypto
  *         implementation.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p seed_size is out of range.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE
  *         There was a failure reading or writing from storage.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The library has already been initialized. It is no longer
  *         possible to call this function.
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_inject_entropy(const uint8_t *seed,
                                         size_t seed_size);
 
 /** \addtogroup crypto_types
  * @{
  */
 
 /** DSA public key.
  *
  * The import and export format is the
  * representation of the public key `y = g^x mod p` as a big-endian byte
  * string. The length of the byte string is the length of the base prime `p`
  * in bytes.
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY                 ((psa_key_type_t) 0x4002)
 
 /** DSA key pair (private and public key).
  *
  * The import and export format is the
  * representation of the private key `x` as a big-endian byte string. The
  * length of the byte string is the private key size in bytes (leading zeroes
  * are not stripped).
  *
  * Deterministic DSA key derivation with psa_generate_derived_key follows
  * FIPS 186-4 §B.1.2: interpret the byte string as integer
  * in big-endian order. Discard it if it is not in the range
  * [0, *N* - 2] where *N* is the boundary of the private key domain
  * (the prime *p* for Diffie-Hellman, the subprime *q* for DSA,
  * or the order of the curve's base point for ECC).
  * Add 1 to the resulting integer and use this as the private key *x*.
  *
  */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_KEY_PAIR                    ((psa_key_type_t) 0x7002)
 
 /** Whether a key type is a DSA key (pair or public-only). */
 #define PSA_KEY_TYPE_IS_DSA(type)                                       \
     (PSA_KEY_TYPE_PUBLIC_KEY_OF_KEY_PAIR(type) == PSA_KEY_TYPE_DSA_PUBLIC_KEY)
 
 #define PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE                        ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000400)
 /** DSA signature with hashing.
  *
  * This is the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4,
  * with a random per-message secret number (*k*).
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
  *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding DSA signature algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_DSA(hash_alg)                             \
     (PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE          ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x06000500)
 #define PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG PSA_ALG_ECDSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG
 /** Deterministic DSA signature with hashing.
  *
  * This is the deterministic variant defined by RFC 6979 of
  * the signature scheme defined by FIPS 186-4.
  *
  * \param hash_alg      A hash algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\p hash_alg) is true).
  *                      This includes #PSA_ALG_ANY_HASH
  *                      when specifying the algorithm in a usage policy.
  *
  * \return              The corresponding DSA signature algorithm.
  * \return              Unspecified if \p hash_alg is not a supported
  *                      hash algorithm.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(hash_alg)                             \
     (PSA_ALG_DETERMINISTIC_DSA_BASE | ((hash_alg) & PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK))
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg)                                             \
     (((alg) & ~PSA_ALG_HASH_MASK & ~PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) ==  \
      PSA_ALG_DSA_BASE)
 #define PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg)               \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_DSA_DETERMINISTIC_FLAG) != 0)
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_DETERMINISTIC_DSA(alg)                       \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_RANDOMIZED_DSA(alg)                          \
     (PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg) && !PSA_ALG_DSA_IS_DETERMINISTIC(alg))
 
 
 /* We need to expand the sample definition of this macro from
  * the API definition. */
 #undef PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_VENDOR_HASH_AND_SIGN(alg)    \
     PSA_ALG_IS_DSA(alg)
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \addtogroup attributes
  * @{
  */
 
 /** PAKE operation stages. */
 #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP 0
 #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COLLECT_INPUTS 1
 #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_COMPUTATION 2
 
 /**@}*/
 
 
 /** \defgroup psa_external_rng External random generator
  * @{
  */
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG)
 /** External random generator function, implemented by the platform.
  *
  * When the compile-time option #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG is enabled,
  * this function replaces Mbed TLS's entropy and DRBG modules for all
  * random generation triggered via PSA crypto interfaces.
  *
  * \note This random generator must deliver random numbers with cryptographic
  *       quality and high performance. It must supply unpredictable numbers
  *       with a uniform distribution. The implementation of this function
  *       is responsible for ensuring that the random generator is seeded
  *       with sufficient entropy. If you have a hardware TRNG which is slow
  *       or delivers non-uniform output, declare it as an entropy source
  *       with mbedtls_entropy_add_source() instead of enabling this option.
  *
  * \param[in,out] context       Pointer to the random generator context.
  *                              This is all-bits-zero on the first call
  *                              and preserved between successive calls.
  * \param[out] output           Output buffer. On success, this buffer
  *                              contains random data with a uniform
  *                              distribution.
  * \param output_size           The size of the \p output buffer in bytes.
  * \param[out] output_length    On success, set this value to \p output_size.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success. The output buffer contains \p output_size bytes of
  *         cryptographic-quality random data, and \c *output_length is
  *         set to \p output_size.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY
  *         The random generator requires extra entropy and there is no
  *         way to obtain entropy under current environment conditions.
  *         This error should not happen under normal circumstances since
  *         this function is responsible for obtaining as much entropy as
  *         it needs. However implementations of this function may return
  *         #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY if there is no way to obtain
  *         entropy without blocking indefinitely.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_HARDWARE_FAILURE
  *         A failure of the random generator hardware that isn't covered
  *         by #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY.
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_external_get_random(
     mbedtls_psa_external_random_context_t *context,
     uint8_t *output, size_t output_size, size_t *output_length);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_EXTERNAL_RNG */
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /** \defgroup psa_builtin_keys Built-in keys
  * @{
  */
 
 /** The minimum value for a key identifier that is built into the
  * implementation.
  *
  * The range of key identifiers from #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN
  * to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX within the range from
  * #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MIN and #PSA_KEY_ID_VENDOR_MAX and must not intersect
  * with any other set of implementation-chosen key identifiers.
  *
  * This value is part of the library's API since changing it would invalidate
  * the values of built-in key identifiers in applications.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN          ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fff0000)
 
 /** The maximum value for a key identifier that is built into the
  * implementation.
  *
  * See #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN for more information.
  */
 #define MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX          ((psa_key_id_t) 0x7fffefff)
 
 /** A slot number identifying a key in a driver.
  *
  * Values of this type are used to identify built-in keys.
  */
 typedef uint64_t psa_drv_slot_number_t;
 
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS)
 /** Test whether a key identifier belongs to the builtin key range.
  *
  * \param key_id  Key identifier to test.
  *
  * \retval 1
  *         The key identifier is a builtin key identifier.
  * \retval 0
  *         The key identifier is not a builtin key identifier.
  */
 static inline int psa_key_id_is_builtin(psa_key_id_t key_id)
 {
     return (key_id >= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN) &&
            (key_id <= MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX);
 }
 
 /** Platform function to obtain the location and slot number of a built-in key.
  *
  * An application-specific implementation of this function must be provided if
  * #MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS is enabled. This would typically be provided
  * as part of a platform's system image.
  *
  * #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_KEY_ID(\p key_id) needs to be in the range from
  * #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MIN to #MBEDTLS_PSA_KEY_ID_BUILTIN_MAX.
  *
  * In a multi-application configuration
  * (\c MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_KEY_ID_ENCODES_OWNER is defined),
  * this function should check that #MBEDTLS_SVC_KEY_ID_GET_OWNER_ID(\p key_id)
  * is allowed to use the given key.
  *
  * \param key_id                The key ID for which to retrieve the
  *                              location and slot attributes.
  * \param[out] lifetime         On success, the lifetime associated with the key
  *                              corresponding to \p key_id. Lifetime is a
  *                              combination of which driver contains the key,
  *                              and with what persistence level the key is
  *                              intended to be used. If the platform
  *                              implementation does not contain specific
  *                              information about the intended key persistence
  *                              level, the persistence level may be reported as
  *                              #PSA_KEY_PERSISTENCE_DEFAULT.
  * \param[out] slot_number      On success, the slot number known to the driver
  *                              registered at the lifetime location reported
  *                              through \p lifetime which corresponds to the
  *                              requested built-in key.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         The requested key identifier designates a built-in key.
  *         In a multi-application configuration, the requested owner
  *         is allowed to access it.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DOES_NOT_EXIST
  *         The requested key identifier is not a built-in key which is known
  *         to this function. If a key exists in the key storage with this
  *         identifier, the data from the storage will be used.
  * \return (any other error)
  *         Any other error is propagated to the function that requested the key.
  *         Common errors include:
  *         - #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED: the key exists but the requested owner
  *           is not allowed to access it.
  */
 psa_status_t mbedtls_psa_platform_get_builtin_key(
     mbedtls_svc_key_id_t key_id,
     psa_key_lifetime_t *lifetime,
     psa_drv_slot_number_t *slot_number);
 #endif /* MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_BUILTIN_KEYS */
 
 /** @} */
 
 /** \addtogroup crypto_types
  * @{
  */
 
 #define PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000000)
 
 /** Whether the specified algorithm is a password-authenticated key exchange.
  *
  * \param alg An algorithm identifier (value of type #psa_algorithm_t).
  *
  * \return 1 if \p alg is a password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
  *         algorithm, 0 otherwise.
  *         This macro may return either 0 or 1 if \p alg is not a supported
  *         algorithm identifier.
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(alg)                                        \
     (((alg) & PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_MASK) == PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE)
 
 /** The Password-authenticated key exchange by juggling (J-PAKE) algorithm.
  *
  * This is J-PAKE as defined by RFC 8236, instantiated with the following
  * parameters:
  *
  * - The group can be either an elliptic curve or defined over a finite field.
  * - Schnorr NIZK proof as defined by RFC 8235 and using the same group as the
  *   J-PAKE algorithm.
  * - A cryptographic hash function.
  *
  * To select these parameters and set up the cipher suite, call these functions
  * in any order:
  *
  * \code
  * psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(cipher_suite, PSA_ALG_JPAKE);
  * psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(cipher_suite,
  *                           PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(type, family, bits));
  * psa_pake_cs_set_hash(cipher_suite, hash);
  * \endcode
  *
  * For more information on how to set a specific curve or field, refer to the
  * documentation of the individual \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants.
  *
  * After initializing a J-PAKE operation, call
  *
  * \code
  * psa_pake_setup(operation, cipher_suite);
  * psa_pake_set_user(operation, ...);
  * psa_pake_set_peer(operation, ...);
  * psa_pake_set_password_key(operation, ...);
  * \endcode
  *
  * The password is provided as a key. This can be the password text itself,
  * in an agreed character encoding, or some value derived from the password
  * as required by a higher level protocol.
  *
  * (The implementation converts the key material to a number as described in
  * Section 2.3.8 of _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_
  * (https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf), before reducing it modulo \c q. Here
  * \c q is order of the group defined by the primitive set in the cipher suite.
  * The \c psa_pake_set_password_key() function returns an error if the result
  * of the reduction is 0.)
  *
  * The key exchange flow for J-PAKE is as follows:
  * -# To get the first round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call
  *    \code
  *    // Get g1
  *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
  *    // Get the ZKP public key for x1
  *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
  *    // Get the ZKP proof for x1
  *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
  *    // Get g2
  *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
  *    // Get the ZKP public key for x2
  *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
  *    // Get the ZKP proof for x2
  *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
  *    \endcode
  * -# To provide the first round data received from the peer to the operation,
  *    call
  *    \code
  *    // Set g3
  *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
  *    // Set the ZKP public key for x3
  *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
  *    // Set the ZKP proof for x3
  *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
  *    // Set g4
  *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
  *    // Set the ZKP public key for x4
  *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
  *    // Set the ZKP proof for x4
  *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
  *    \endcode
  * -# To get the second round data that needs to be sent to the peer, call
  *    \code
  *    // Get A
  *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
  *    // Get ZKP public key for x2*s
  *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
  *    // Get ZKP proof for x2*s
  *    psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
  *    \endcode
  * -# To provide the second round data received from the peer to the operation,
  *    call
  *    \code
  *    // Set B
  *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...);
  *    // Set ZKP public key for x4*s
  *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC, ...);
  *    // Set ZKP proof for x4*s
  *    psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF, ...);
  *    \endcode
  * -# To access the shared secret call
  *    \code
  *    // Get Ka=Kb=K
  *    psa_pake_get_implicit_key()
  *    \endcode
  *
  * For more information consult the documentation of the individual
  * \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants.
  *
  * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated
  * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no
  * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so.
  *
  * That is, the authentication is only implicit (the peer is not authenticated
  * at this point, and no action should be taken that assume that they are - like
  * for example accessing restricted files).
  *
  * To make the authentication explicit there are various methods, see Section 5
  * of RFC 8236 for two examples.
  *
  */
 #define PSA_ALG_JPAKE                   ((psa_algorithm_t) 0x0a000100)
 
 /** @} */
 
 /** \defgroup pake Password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
  *
  * This is a proposed PAKE interface for the PSA Crypto API. It is not part of
  * the official PSA Crypto API yet.
  *
  * \note The content of this section is not part of the stable API and ABI
  *       of Mbed TLS and may change arbitrarily from version to version.
  *       Same holds for the corresponding macros #PSA_ALG_CATEGORY_PAKE and
  *       #PSA_ALG_JPAKE.
  * @{
  */
 
 /** \brief Encoding of the application role of PAKE
  *
  * Encodes the application's role in the algorithm is being executed. For more
  * information see the documentation of individual \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX
  * constants.
  */
 typedef uint8_t psa_pake_role_t;
 
 /** Encoding of input and output indicators for PAKE.
  *
  * Some PAKE algorithms need to exchange more data than just a single key share.
  * This type is for encoding additional input and output data for such
  * algorithms.
  */
 typedef uint8_t psa_pake_step_t;
 
 /** Encoding of the type of the PAKE's primitive.
  *
  * Values defined by this standard will never be in the range 0x80-0xff.
  * Vendors who define additional types must use an encoding in this range.
  *
  * For more information see the documentation of individual
  * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants.
  */
 typedef uint8_t psa_pake_primitive_type_t;
 
 /** \brief Encoding of the family of the primitive associated with the PAKE.
  *
  * For more information see the documentation of individual
  * \c PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_XXX constants.
  */
 typedef uint8_t psa_pake_family_t;
 
 /** \brief Encoding of the primitive associated with the PAKE.
  *
  * For more information see the documentation of the #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE macro.
  */
 typedef uint32_t psa_pake_primitive_t;
 
 /** A value to indicate no role in a PAKE algorithm.
  * This value can be used in a call to psa_pake_set_role() for symmetric PAKE
  * algorithms which do not assign roles.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE                  ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x00)
 
 /** The first peer in a balanced PAKE.
  *
  * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an
  * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not
  * need this, both #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST and #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are
  * accepted.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST                ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x01)
 
 /** The second peer in a balanced PAKE.
  *
  * Although balanced PAKE algorithms are symmetric, some of them needs an
  * ordering of peers for the transcript calculations. If the algorithm does not
  * need this, either #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_FIRST or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND are
  * accepted.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SECOND                ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x02)
 
 /** The client in an augmented PAKE.
  *
  * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_CLIENT                ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x11)
 
 /** The server in an augmented PAKE.
  *
  * Augmented PAKE algorithms need to differentiate between client and server.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_ROLE_SERVER                ((psa_pake_role_t) 0x12)
 
 /** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of elliptic curves.
  *
  * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify a
  * specific elliptic curve, using the same mapping that is used for ECC
  * (::psa_ecc_family_t) keys.
  *
  * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and
  * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().)
  *
  * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar
  * values:
  * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the
  *  specific curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
  *  psa_export_public_key().
  * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific
  *  curve would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
  *  psa_export_key().
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC       ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x01)
 
 /** The PAKE primitive type indicating the use of Diffie-Hellman groups.
  *
  * The values of the \c family and \c bits fields of the cipher suite identify
  * a specific Diffie-Hellman group, using the same mapping that is used for
  * Diffie-Hellman (::psa_dh_family_t) keys.
  *
  * (Here \c family means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_family() and
  * \c bits means the value returned by psa_pake_cs_get_bits().)
  *
  * Input and output during the operation can involve group elements and scalar
  * values:
  * -# The format for group elements is the same as for public keys on the
  *  specific group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
  *  psa_export_public_key().
  * -# The format for scalars is the same as for private keys on the specific
  *  group would be. For more information, consult the documentation of
  *  psa_export_key().
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_DH       ((psa_pake_primitive_type_t) 0x02)
 
 /** Construct a PAKE primitive from type, family and bit-size.
  *
  * \param pake_type     The type of the primitive
  *                      (value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t).
  * \param pake_family   The family of the primitive
  *                      (the type and interpretation of this parameter depends
  *                      on \p pake_type, for more information consult the
  *                      documentation of individual ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t
  *                      constants).
  * \param pake_bits     The bit-size of the primitive
  *                      (Value of type \c size_t. The interpretation
  *                      of this parameter depends on \p pake_family, for more
  *                      information consult the documentation of individual
  *                      ::psa_pake_primitive_type_t constants).
  *
  * \return The constructed primitive value of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t.
  *         Return 0 if the requested primitive can't be encoded as
  *         ::psa_pake_primitive_t.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(pake_type, pake_family, pake_bits) \
     ((pake_bits & 0xFFFF) != pake_bits) ? 0 :                 \
     ((psa_pake_primitive_t) (((pake_type) << 24 |             \
                               (pake_family) << 16) | (pake_bits)))
 
 /** The key share being sent to or received from the peer.
  *
  * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public
  * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would
  * be.
  *
  * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of
  * psa_export_public_key().
  *
  * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the
  * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE                 ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x01)
 
 /** A Schnorr NIZKP public key.
  *
  * This is the ephemeral public key in the Schnorr Non-Interactive
  * Zero-Knowledge Proof (the value denoted by the letter 'V' in RFC 8235).
  *
  * The format for both input and output at this step is the same as for public
  * keys on the group determined by the primitive (::psa_pake_primitive_t) would
  * be.
  *
  * For more information on the format, consult the documentation of
  * psa_export_public_key().
  *
  * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the
  * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC                 ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x02)
 
 /** A Schnorr NIZKP proof.
  *
  * This is the proof in the Schnorr Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (the
  * value denoted by the letter 'r' in RFC 8235).
  *
  * Both for input and output, the value at this step is an integer less than
  * the order of the group selected in the cipher suite. The format depends on
  * the group as well:
  *
  * - For Montgomery curves, the encoding is little endian.
  * - For everything else the encoding is big endian (see Section 2.3.8 of
  *   _SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography_ at https://www.secg.org/sec1-v2.pdf).
  *
  * In both cases leading zeroes are allowed as long as the length in bytes does
  * not exceed the byte length of the group order.
  *
  * For information regarding how the group is determined, consult the
  * documentation #PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF                  ((psa_pake_step_t) 0x03)
 
 /** The type of the data structure for PAKE cipher suites.
  *
  * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
  * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
  * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice.
  */
 typedef struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_t;
 
 /** Return an initial value for a PAKE cipher suite object.
  */
 static psa_pake_cipher_suite_t psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void);
 
 /** Retrieve the PAKE algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite.
  *
  * \param[in] cipher_suite     The cipher suite structure to query.
  *
  * \return The PAKE algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure.
  */
 static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
 
 /** Declare the PAKE algorithm for the cipher suite.
  *
  * This function overwrites any PAKE algorithm
  * previously set in \p cipher_suite.
  *
  * \param[out] cipher_suite    The cipher suite structure to write to.
  * \param algorithm            The PAKE algorithm to write.
  *                             (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t
  *                             such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true.)
  *                             If this is 0, the PAKE algorithm in
  *                             \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified.
  */
 static void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
                                       psa_algorithm_t algorithm);
 
 /** Retrieve the primitive from a PAKE cipher suite.
  *
  * \param[in] cipher_suite     The cipher suite structure to query.
  *
  * \return The primitive stored in the cipher suite structure.
  */
 static psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
 
 /** Declare the primitive for a PAKE cipher suite.
  *
  * This function overwrites any primitive previously set in \p cipher_suite.
  *
  * \param[out] cipher_suite    The cipher suite structure to write to.
  * \param primitive            The primitive to write. If this is 0, the
  *                             primitive type in \p cipher_suite becomes
  *                             unspecified.
  */
 static void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
                                       psa_pake_primitive_t primitive);
 
 /** Retrieve the PAKE family from a PAKE cipher suite.
  *
  * \param[in] cipher_suite     The cipher suite structure to query.
  *
  * \return The PAKE family stored in the cipher suite structure.
  */
 static psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
 
 /** Retrieve the PAKE primitive bit-size from a PAKE cipher suite.
  *
  * \param[in] cipher_suite     The cipher suite structure to query.
  *
  * \return The PAKE primitive bit-size stored in the cipher suite structure.
  */
 static uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
 
 /** Retrieve the hash algorithm from a PAKE cipher suite.
  *
  * \param[in] cipher_suite      The cipher suite structure to query.
  *
  * \return The hash algorithm stored in the cipher suite structure. The return
  *         value is 0 if the PAKE is not parametrised by a hash algorithm or if
  *         the hash algorithm is not set.
  */
 static psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
 
 /** Declare the hash algorithm for a PAKE cipher suite.
  *
  * This function overwrites any hash algorithm
  * previously set in \p cipher_suite.
  *
  * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
  * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
  * for more information.
  *
  * \param[out] cipher_suite     The cipher suite structure to write to.
  * \param hash                  The hash involved in the cipher suite.
  *                              (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type ::psa_algorithm_t
  *                              such that #PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(\c alg) is true.)
  *                              If this is 0, the hash algorithm in
  *                              \p cipher_suite becomes unspecified.
  */
 static void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
                                  psa_algorithm_t hash);
 
 /** The type of the state data structure for PAKE operations.
  *
  * Before calling any function on a PAKE operation object, the application
  * must initialize it by any of the following means:
  * - Set the structure to all-bits-zero, for example:
  *   \code
  *   psa_pake_operation_t operation;
  *   memset(&operation, 0, sizeof(operation));
  *   \endcode
  * - Initialize the structure to logical zero values, for example:
  *   \code
  *   psa_pake_operation_t operation = {0};
  *   \endcode
  * - Initialize the structure to the initializer #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT,
  *   for example:
  *   \code
  *   psa_pake_operation_t operation = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT;
  *   \endcode
  * - Assign the result of the function psa_pake_operation_init()
  *   to the structure, for example:
  *   \code
  *   psa_pake_operation_t operation;
  *   operation = psa_pake_operation_init();
  *   \endcode
  *
  * This is an implementation-defined \c struct. Applications should not
  * make any assumptions about the content of this structure.
  * Implementation details can change in future versions without notice. */
 typedef struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_t;
 
 /** The type of input values for PAKE operations. */
 typedef struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t;
 
 /** The type of computation stage for J-PAKE operations. */
 typedef struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s psa_jpake_computation_stage_t;
 
 /** Return an initial value for a PAKE operation object.
  */
 static psa_pake_operation_t psa_pake_operation_init(void);
 
 /** Get the length of the password in bytes from given inputs.
  *
  * \param[in]  inputs           Operation inputs.
  * \param[out] password_len     Password length.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         Password hasn't been set yet.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password_len(
     const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
     size_t *password_len);
 
 /** Get the password from given inputs.
  *
  * \param[in]  inputs           Operation inputs.
  * \param[out] buffer           Return buffer for password.
  * \param      buffer_size      Size of the return buffer in bytes.
  * \param[out] buffer_length    Actual size of the password in bytes.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         Password hasn't been set yet.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_password(
     const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
     uint8_t *buffer, size_t buffer_size, size_t *buffer_length);
 
 /** Get the length of the user id in bytes from given inputs.
  *
  * \param[in]  inputs           Operation inputs.
  * \param[out] user_len         User id length.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         User id hasn't been set yet.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user_len(
     const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
     size_t *user_len);
 
 /** Get the length of the peer id in bytes from given inputs.
  *
  * \param[in]  inputs           Operation inputs.
  * \param[out] peer_len         Peer id length.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         Peer id hasn't been set yet.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer_len(
     const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
     size_t *peer_len);
 
 /** Get the user id from given inputs.
  *
  * \param[in]  inputs           Operation inputs.
  * \param[out] user_id          User id.
  * \param      user_id_size     Size of \p user_id in bytes.
  * \param[out] user_id_len      Size of the user id in bytes.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         User id hasn't been set yet.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p user_id is too small.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_user(
     const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
     uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_size, size_t *user_id_len);
 
 /** Get the peer id from given inputs.
  *
  * \param[in]  inputs           Operation inputs.
  * \param[out] peer_id          Peer id.
  * \param      peer_id_size     Size of \p peer_id in bytes.
  * \param[out] peer_id_length   Size of the peer id in bytes.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         Peer id hasn't been set yet.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p peer_id is too small.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_peer(
     const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
     uint8_t *peer_id, size_t peer_id_size, size_t *peer_id_length);
 
 /** Get the cipher suite from given inputs.
  *
  * \param[in]  inputs           Operation inputs.
  * \param[out] cipher_suite     Return buffer for role.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         Cipher_suite hasn't been set yet.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_crypto_driver_pake_get_cipher_suite(
     const psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t *inputs,
     psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
 
 /** Set the session information for a password-authenticated key exchange.
  *
  * The sequence of operations to set up a password-authenticated key exchange
  * is as follows:
  * -# Allocate an operation object which will be passed to all the functions
  *    listed here.
  * -# Initialize the operation object with one of the methods described in the
  *    documentation for #psa_pake_operation_t, e.g.
  *    #PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT.
  * -# Call psa_pake_setup() to specify the cipher suite.
  * -# Call \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions on the operation to complete the
  *    setup. The exact sequence of \c psa_pake_set_xxx() functions that needs
  *    to be called depends on the algorithm in use.
  *
  * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
  * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
  * for more information.
  *
  * A typical sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
  * exchange:
  * -# Call psa_pake_output(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to get the
  *    key share that needs to be sent to the peer.
  * -# Call psa_pake_input(operation, #PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE, ...) to provide
  *    the key share that was received from the peer.
  * -# Depending on the algorithm additional calls to psa_pake_output() and
  *    psa_pake_input() might be necessary.
  * -# Call psa_pake_get_implicit_key() for accessing the shared secret.
  *
  * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
  * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
  * for more information.
  *
  * If an error occurs at any step after a call to psa_pake_setup(),
  * the operation will need to be reset by a call to psa_pake_abort(). The
  * application may call psa_pake_abort() at any time after the operation
  * has been initialized.
  *
  * After a successful call to psa_pake_setup(), the application must
  * eventually terminate the operation. The following events terminate an
  * operation:
  * - A call to psa_pake_abort().
  * - A successful call to psa_pake_get_implicit_key().
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set up. It must have
  *                              been initialized but not set up yet.
  * \param[in] cipher_suite      The cipher suite to use. (A cipher suite fully
  *                              characterizes a PAKE algorithm and determines
  *                              the algorithm as well.)
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a PAKE algorithm, or the
  *         PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not compatible with the
  *         PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in \p cipher_suite is invalid
  *         or not compatible with the PAKE algorithm and primitive.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The algorithm in \p cipher_suite is not a supported PAKE algorithm,
  *         or the PAKE primitive in \p cipher_suite is not supported or not
  *         compatible with the PAKE algorithm, or the hash algorithm in
  *         \p cipher_suite is not supported or not compatible with the PAKE
  *         algorithm and primitive.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid, or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_pake_setup(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                             const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite);
 
 /** Set the password for a password-authenticated key exchange from key ID.
  *
  * Call this function when the password, or a value derived from the password,
  * is already present in the key store.
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set the password for. It
  *                              must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and
  *                              not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor
  *                              psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must
  *                              be on operation for which the password hasn't
  *                              been set yet (psa_pake_set_password_key()
  *                              hasn't been called yet).
  * \param password              Identifier of the key holding the password or a
  *                              value derived from the password (eg. by a
  *                              memory-hard function).  It must remain valid
  *                              until the operation terminates. It must be of
  *                              type #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or
  *                              #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH. It has to allow
  *                              the usage #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_HANDLE
  *         \p password is not a valid key identifier.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_PERMITTED
  *         The key does not have the #PSA_KEY_USAGE_DERIVE flag, or it does not
  *         permit the \p operation's algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The key type for \p password is not #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD or
  *         #PSA_KEY_TYPE_PASSWORD_HASH, or \p password is not compatible with
  *         the \p operation's cipher suite.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The key type or key size of \p password is not supported with the
  *         \p operation's cipher suite.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must have been set up.), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_pake_set_password_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                                        mbedtls_svc_key_id_t password);
 
 /** Set the user ID for a password-authenticated key exchange.
  *
  * Call this function to set the user ID. For PAKE algorithms that associate a
  * user identifier with each side of the session you need to call
  * psa_pake_set_peer() as well. For PAKE algorithms that associate a single
  * user identifier with the session, call psa_pake_set_user() only.
  *
  * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
  * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
  * for more information.
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set the user ID for. It
  *                              must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and
  *                              not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor
  *                              psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must
  *                              be on operation for which the user ID hasn't
  *                              been set (psa_pake_set_user() hasn't been
  *                              called yet).
  * \param[in] user_id           The user ID to authenticate with.
  * \param user_id_len           Size of the \p user_id buffer in bytes.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p user_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher
  *         suite.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The value of \p user_id is not supported by the implementation.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid, or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_pake_set_user(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                                const uint8_t *user_id,
                                size_t user_id_len);
 
 /** Set the peer ID for a password-authenticated key exchange.
  *
  * Call this function in addition to psa_pake_set_user() for PAKE algorithms
  * that associate a user identifier with each side of the session. For PAKE
  * algorithms that associate a single user identifier with the session, call
  * psa_pake_set_user() only.
  *
  * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
  * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
  * for more information.
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to set the peer ID for. It
  *                              must have been set up by psa_pake_setup() and
  *                              not yet in use (neither psa_pake_output() nor
  *                              psa_pake_input() has been called yet). It must
  *                              be on operation for which the peer ID hasn't
  *                              been set (psa_pake_set_peer() hasn't been
  *                              called yet).
  * \param[in] peer_id           The peer's ID to authenticate.
  * \param peer_id_len           Size of the \p peer_id buffer in bytes.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p peer_id is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm and cipher
  *         suite.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The algorithm doesn't associate a second identity with the session.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         Calling psa_pake_set_peer() is invalid with the \p operation's
  *         algorithm, the operation state is not valid, or the library has not
  *         been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_pake_set_peer(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                                const uint8_t *peer_id,
                                size_t peer_id_len);
 
 /** Set the application role for a password-authenticated key exchange.
  *
  * Not all PAKE algorithms need to differentiate the communicating entities.
  * It is optional to call this function for PAKEs that don't require a role
  * to be specified. For such PAKEs the application role parameter is ignored,
  * or #PSA_PAKE_ROLE_NONE can be passed as \c role.
  *
  * Refer to the documentation of individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX`
  * values of type ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true)
  * for more information.
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation     The operation object to specify the
  *                              application's role for. It must have been set up
  *                              by psa_pake_setup() and not yet in use (neither
  *                              psa_pake_output() nor psa_pake_input() has been
  *                              called yet). It must be on operation for which
  *                              the application's role hasn't been specified
  *                              (psa_pake_set_role() hasn't been called yet).
  * \param role                  A value of type ::psa_pake_role_t indicating the
  *                              application's role in the PAKE the algorithm
  *                              that is being set up. For more information see
  *                              the documentation of \c PSA_PAKE_ROLE_XXX
  *                              constants.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         The \p role is not a valid PAKE role in the \p operation’s algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         The \p role for this algorithm is not supported or is not valid.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid, or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_pake_set_role(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                                psa_pake_role_t role);
 
 /** Get output for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange.
  *
  * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this
  * function several times or you might not need to call this at all.
  *
  * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
  * exchange depends on the algorithm in use.  Refer to the documentation of
  * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type
  * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more
  * information.
  *
  * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
  * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort().
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation    Active PAKE operation.
  * \param step                 The step of the algorithm for which the output is
  *                             requested.
  * \param[out] output          Buffer where the output is to be written in the
  *                             format appropriate for this \p step. Refer to
  *                             the documentation of the individual
  *                             \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more
  *                             information.
  * \param output_size          Size of the \p output buffer in bytes. This must
  *                             be at least #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\c alg, \c
  *                             primitive, \p output_step) where \c alg and
  *                             \p primitive are the PAKE algorithm and primitive
  *                             in the operation's cipher suite, and \p step is
  *                             the output step.
  *
  * \param[out] output_length   On success, the number of bytes of the returned
  *                             output.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL
  *         The size of the \p output buffer is too small.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p step is not compatible with the operation's algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p step is not supported with the operation's algorithm.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_ENTROPY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set
  *         up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements
  *         for ordering of input and output steps), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_pake_output(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                              psa_pake_step_t step,
                              uint8_t *output,
                              size_t output_size,
                              size_t *output_length);
 
 /** Provide input for a step of a password-authenticated key exchange.
  *
  * Depending on the algorithm being executed, you might need to call this
  * function several times or you might not need to call this at all.
  *
  * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
  * exchange depends on the algorithm in use.  Refer to the documentation of
  * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type
  * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more
  * information.
  *
  * If this function returns an error status, the operation enters an error
  * state and must be aborted by calling psa_pake_abort().
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation    Active PAKE operation.
  * \param step                 The step for which the input is provided.
  * \param[in] input            Buffer containing the input in the format
  *                             appropriate for this \p step. Refer to the
  *                             documentation of the individual
  *                             \c PSA_PAKE_STEP_XXX constants for more
  *                             information.
  * \param input_length         Size of the \p input buffer in bytes.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_SIGNATURE
  *         The verification fails for a #PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PROOF input step.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         \p input_length is not compatible with the \p operation’s algorithm,
  *         or the \p input is not valid for the \p operation's algorithm,
  *         cipher suite or \p step.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         \p step p is not supported with the \p operation's algorithm, or the
  *         \p input is not supported for the \p operation's algorithm, cipher
  *         suite or \p step.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The operation state is not valid (it must be active, and fully set
  *         up, and this call must conform to the algorithm's requirements
  *         for ordering of input and output steps), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_pake_input(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                             psa_pake_step_t step,
                             const uint8_t *input,
                             size_t input_length);
 
 /** Get implicitly confirmed shared secret from a PAKE.
  *
  * At this point there is a cryptographic guarantee that only the authenticated
  * party who used the same password is able to compute the key. But there is no
  * guarantee that the peer is the party it claims to be and was able to do so.
  *
  * That is, the authentication is only implicit. Since the peer is not
  * authenticated yet, no action should be taken yet that assumes that the peer
  * is who it claims to be. For example, do not access restricted files on the
  * peer's behalf until an explicit authentication has succeeded.
  *
  * This function can be called after the key exchange phase of the operation
  * has completed. It imports the shared secret output of the PAKE into the
  * provided derivation operation. The input step
  * #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is used when placing the shared key
  * material in the key derivation operation.
  *
  * The exact sequence of calls to perform a password-authenticated key
  * exchange depends on the algorithm in use.  Refer to the documentation of
  * individual PAKE algorithm types (`PSA_ALG_XXX` values of type
  * ::psa_algorithm_t such that #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\c alg) is true) for more
  * information.
  *
  * When this function returns successfully, \p operation becomes inactive.
  * If this function returns an error status, both \p operation
  * and \c key_derivation operations enter an error state and must be aborted by
  * calling psa_pake_abort() and psa_key_derivation_abort() respectively.
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation    Active PAKE operation.
  * \param[out] output          A key derivation operation that is ready
  *                             for an input step of type
  *                             #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT
  *         #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET is not compatible with the
  *         algorithm in the \p output key derivation operation.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_NOT_SUPPORTED
  *         Input from a PAKE is not supported by the algorithm in the \p output
  *         key derivation operation.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_INSUFFICIENT_MEMORY \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_STORAGE_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_CORRUPT \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_DATA_INVALID \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The PAKE operation state is not valid (it must be active, but beyond
  *         that validity is specific to the algorithm), or
  *         the library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init(),
  *         or the state of \p output is not valid for
  *         the #PSA_KEY_DERIVATION_INPUT_SECRET step. This can happen if the
  *         step is out of order or the application has done this step already
  *         and it may not be repeated.
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_pake_get_implicit_key(psa_pake_operation_t *operation,
                                        psa_key_derivation_operation_t *output);
 
 /** Abort a PAKE operation.
  *
  * Aborting an operation frees all associated resources except for the \c
  * operation structure itself. Once aborted, the operation object can be reused
  * for another operation by calling psa_pake_setup() again.
  *
  * This function may be called at any time after the operation
  * object has been initialized as described in #psa_pake_operation_t.
  *
  * In particular, calling psa_pake_abort() after the operation has been
  * terminated by a call to psa_pake_abort() or psa_pake_get_implicit_key()
  * is safe and has no effect.
  *
  * \param[in,out] operation    The operation to abort.
  *
  * \retval #PSA_SUCCESS
  *         Success.
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_COMMUNICATION_FAILURE \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_CORRUPTION_DETECTED \emptydescription
  * \retval #PSA_ERROR_BAD_STATE
  *         The library has not been previously initialized by psa_crypto_init().
  *         It is implementation-dependent whether a failure to initialize
  *         results in this error code.
  */
 psa_status_t psa_pake_abort(psa_pake_operation_t *operation);
 
 /**@}*/
 
 /** A sufficient output buffer size for psa_pake_output().
  *
  * If the size of the output buffer is at least this large, it is guaranteed
  * that psa_pake_output() will not fail due to an insufficient output buffer
  * size. The actual size of the output might be smaller in any given call.
  *
  * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE
  *
  * \param alg           A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true).
  * \param primitive     A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is
  *                      compatible with algorithm \p alg.
  * \param output_step   A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the
  *                      algorithm \p alg.
  * \return              A sufficient output buffer size for the specified
  *                      PAKE algorithm, primitive, and output step. If the
  *                      PAKE algorithm, primitive, or output step is not
  *                      recognized, or the parameters are incompatible,
  *                      return 0.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, output_step)               \
     (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE &&                                           \
      primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC,      \
                                      PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ?    \
      (                                                                 \
          output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 :                   \
          output_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 :                   \
          32                                                              \
      ) :                                                               \
      0)
 
 /** A sufficient input buffer size for psa_pake_input().
  *
  * The value returned by this macro is guaranteed to be large enough for any
  * valid input to psa_pake_input() in an operation with the specified
  * parameters.
  *
  * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE
  *
  * \param alg           A PAKE algorithm (\c PSA_ALG_XXX value such that
  *                      #PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(\p alg) is true).
  * \param primitive     A primitive of type ::psa_pake_primitive_t that is
  *                      compatible with algorithm \p alg.
  * \param input_step    A value of type ::psa_pake_step_t that is valid for the
  *                      algorithm \p alg.
  * \return              A sufficient input buffer size for the specified
  *                      input, cipher suite and algorithm. If the cipher suite,
  *                      the input type or PAKE algorithm is not recognized, or
  *                      the parameters are incompatible, return 0.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(alg, primitive, input_step)                 \
     (alg == PSA_ALG_JPAKE &&                                           \
      primitive == PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE_TYPE_ECC,      \
                                      PSA_ECC_FAMILY_SECP_R1, 256) ?    \
      (                                                                 \
          input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_KEY_SHARE ? 65 :                    \
          input_step == PSA_PAKE_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC ? 65 :                    \
          32                                                              \
      ) :                                                               \
      0)
 
 /** Output buffer size for psa_pake_output() for any of the supported PAKE
  * algorithm and primitive suites and output step.
  *
  * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer.
  *
  * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value
  * returned by PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE()
  *
  * See also #PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step).
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_OUTPUT_MAX_SIZE 65
 
 /** Input buffer size for psa_pake_input() for any of the supported PAKE
  * algorithm and primitive suites and input step.
  *
  * This macro must expand to a compile-time constant integer.
  *
  * The value of this macro must be at least as large as the largest value
  * returned by PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE()
  *
  * See also #PSA_PAKE_INPUT_SIZE(\p alg, \p primitive, \p output_step).
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_INPUT_MAX_SIZE 65
 
 /** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE cipher suite object of type
  * psa_pake_cipher_suite_t.
  */
 #define PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT { PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, 0, 0, PSA_ALG_NONE }
 
 /** Returns a suitable initializer for a PAKE operation object of type
  * psa_pake_operation_t.
  */
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
 #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0 }
 #else
 #define PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT { 0, PSA_ALG_NONE, 0, PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_STAGE_SETUP, \
                                   { 0 }, { { 0 } } }
 #endif
 
 struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s {
     psa_algorithm_t algorithm;
     psa_pake_primitive_type_t type;
     psa_pake_family_t family;
     uint16_t  bits;
     psa_algorithm_t hash;
 };
 
 static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_algorithm(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
 {
     return cipher_suite->algorithm;
 }
 
 static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_algorithm(
     psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
     psa_algorithm_t algorithm)
 {
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_PAKE(algorithm)) {
         cipher_suite->algorithm = 0;
     } else {
         cipher_suite->algorithm = algorithm;
     }
 }
 
 static inline psa_pake_primitive_t psa_pake_cs_get_primitive(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
 {
     return PSA_PAKE_PRIMITIVE(cipher_suite->type, cipher_suite->family,
                               cipher_suite->bits);
 }
 
 static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_primitive(
     psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
     psa_pake_primitive_t primitive)
 {
     cipher_suite->type = (psa_pake_primitive_type_t) (primitive >> 24);
     cipher_suite->family = (psa_pake_family_t) (0xFF & (primitive >> 16));
     cipher_suite->bits = (uint16_t) (0xFFFF & primitive);
 }
 
 static inline psa_pake_family_t psa_pake_cs_get_family(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
 {
     return cipher_suite->family;
 }
 
 static inline uint16_t psa_pake_cs_get_bits(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
 {
     return cipher_suite->bits;
 }
 
 static inline psa_algorithm_t psa_pake_cs_get_hash(
     const psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite)
 {
     return cipher_suite->hash;
 }
 
 static inline void psa_pake_cs_set_hash(psa_pake_cipher_suite_t *cipher_suite,
                                         psa_algorithm_t hash)
 {
     if (!PSA_ALG_IS_HASH(hash)) {
         cipher_suite->hash = 0;
     } else {
         cipher_suite->hash = hash;
     }
 }
 
 struct psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_s {
     uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password);
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(password_len);
     uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user);
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(user_len);
     uint8_t *MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer);
     size_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(peer_len);
     psa_key_attributes_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(attributes);
     psa_pake_cipher_suite_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(cipher_suite);
 };
 
 typedef enum psa_crypto_driver_pake_step {
     PSA_JPAKE_STEP_INVALID        = 0,  /* Invalid step */
     PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_KEY_SHARE   = 1,  /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X1).*/
     PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC   = 2,  /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X1 key */
     PSA_JPAKE_X1_STEP_ZK_PROOF    = 3,  /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X1 key */
     PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_KEY_SHARE   = 4,  /* Round 1: input/output key share (for ephemeral private key X2).*/
     PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC   = 5,  /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2 key */
     PSA_JPAKE_X2_STEP_ZK_PROOF    = 6,  /* Round 1: input/output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2 key */
     PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_KEY_SHARE  = 7,  /* Round 2: output X2S key (our key) */
     PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC  = 8,  /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X2S key (our key) */
     PSA_JPAKE_X2S_STEP_ZK_PROOF   = 9,  /* Round 2: output Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X2S key (our key) */
     PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_KEY_SHARE  = 10, /* Round 2: input X4S key (from peer) */
     PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PUBLIC  = 11, /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP public key for the X4S key (from peer) */
     PSA_JPAKE_X4S_STEP_ZK_PROOF   = 12  /* Round 2: input Schnorr NIZKP proof for the X4S key (from peer) */
 } psa_crypto_driver_pake_step_t;
 
 typedef enum psa_jpake_round {
     PSA_JPAKE_FIRST = 0,
     PSA_JPAKE_SECOND = 1,
     PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED = 2
 } psa_jpake_round_t;
 
 typedef enum psa_jpake_io_mode {
     PSA_JPAKE_INPUT = 0,
     PSA_JPAKE_OUTPUT = 1
 } psa_jpake_io_mode_t;
 
 struct psa_jpake_computation_stage_s {
     /* The J-PAKE round we are currently on */
     psa_jpake_round_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(round);
     /* The 'mode' we are currently in (inputting or outputting) */
     psa_jpake_io_mode_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(io_mode);
     /* The number of completed inputs so far this round */
     uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs);
     /* The number of completed outputs so far this round */
     uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(outputs);
     /* The next expected step (KEY_SHARE, ZK_PUBLIC or ZK_PROOF) */
     psa_pake_step_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(step);
 };
 
 #define PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_INPUTS(round) ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED ? 0 : \
                                           ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1))
 #define PSA_JPAKE_EXPECTED_OUTPUTS(round) ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FINISHED ? 0 : \
                                            ((round) == PSA_JPAKE_FIRST ? 2 : 1))
 
 struct psa_pake_operation_s {
 #if defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_CLIENT) && !defined(MBEDTLS_PSA_CRYPTO_C)
     mbedtls_psa_client_handle_t handle;
 #else
     /** Unique ID indicating which driver got assigned to do the
      * operation. Since driver contexts are driver-specific, swapping
      * drivers halfway through the operation is not supported.
      * ID values are auto-generated in psa_crypto_driver_wrappers.h
      * ID value zero means the context is not valid or not assigned to
      * any driver (i.e. none of the driver contexts are active). */
     unsigned int MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(id);
     /* Algorithm of the PAKE operation */
     psa_algorithm_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(alg);
     /* A primitive of type compatible with algorithm */
     psa_pake_primitive_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(primitive);
     /* Stage of the PAKE operation: waiting for the setup, collecting inputs
      * or computing. */
     uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(stage);
     /* Holds computation stage of the PAKE algorithms. */
     union {
         uint8_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(dummy);
 #if defined(PSA_WANT_ALG_JPAKE)
         psa_jpake_computation_stage_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(jpake);
 #endif
     } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(computation_stage);
     union {
         psa_driver_pake_context_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(ctx);
         psa_crypto_driver_pake_inputs_t MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(inputs);
     } MBEDTLS_PRIVATE(data);
 #endif
 };
 
 static inline struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s psa_pake_cipher_suite_init(void)
 {
     const struct psa_pake_cipher_suite_s v = PSA_PAKE_CIPHER_SUITE_INIT;
     return v;
 }
 
 static inline struct psa_pake_operation_s psa_pake_operation_init(void)
 {
     const struct psa_pake_operation_s v = PSA_PAKE_OPERATION_INIT;
     return v;
 }
 
 #ifdef __cplusplus
 }
 #endif
 
 #endif /* PSA_CRYPTO_EXTRA_H */

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